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The first chapter derives an empirically testable set of propositions on the 
determinants of environmental aid as a non-market solution for trans-border pollution. 
The donor country balances environmental benefits against the social costs of aid 
which results from possible erosion of competitiveness in the export market. Using 
the panel data for environmental aid from OECD countries to China, it is shown that 
trade competition significantly reduces types of environmental aid that enhance the 
competitiveness of China. As the scope of environmental aid that improves China’s 
energy efficiency is limited by trade competition, the change in composition of 
bilateral environmental aid may reflect a means by which a solution to the trans-
border pollution issue can be found.  
The second chapter shows that the dynamic properties of the pollution-income 
relationship under an optimal pollution tax depends on three key factors, namely the 
  
degree of temporal and inter-temporal flexibility in consumption and the elasticity of 
substitution among production inputs. This paper derives general conditions for 
eluding the limits to growth showing that they require rather stringent assumptions 
which the existing literature has failed to identify. 
Finally, the third chapter examines environmentally sustainable growth with 
reference to climate change assuming two final outputs and two factors of production, 
accounting for both pollution flow and stock effects. If the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption is greater than one, an optimal pollution tax ensures 
sustainable growth without any further government intervention. Otherwise, either a 
high temporal elasticity of substitution in production or consumption is required for 
sustainability. Even a suboptimal pollution tax may allow sustainable development 
provided the tax time profile meets certain conditions that are developed and 
































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor  Ramón López, Chair 
Professor  Kenneth McConnell 
Professor  Charles Towe 
Professor  Maureen Cropper 
























© Copyright by 
















  ii 
 
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, parents, my wife Nara and my new 

































  iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my advisor, Ramón López, for being the most significant 
mentor for the last four years. I would also like to thank my committee members – 
Maureen Cropper, Ted McConnell, Charles Towe, and Lars Olson. Finally, I would 
like to thank Robert Williams, Dana Andersen, Jinil Kim, Jong Wha Lee and Pablo 
Gutiérrez who provided insightful comments and criticisms. 
 
  iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Strategic Bilateral Environmental Aid and Trans-border Pollution ............ 1 
 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
 2. The Basic Model and Testable Hypothesis……………….…………………….....4 
2.1. The Basic Model and Testable Hypothesis………………………………........4 
2.2. Description of the Three-Stage Game of Technology Transfer……………......7 
2.3. Strategic Objective of the Donor Government……....…………………….......9 
2.4. Equilibrium with Technology Transfer……...……....…………………….....10 
2.4.1. The welfare effect of EODA for the donor country…..………….……......10 
2.4.2. Trade Competitiveness and the Size of EODA ………..……………….....14 
2.4.3. Transferring “pure” Abatement Technology……...…..………………......16 
3. Empirical Analysis………………………………………………………………...21 
3.1. Data……………………………………….………………………………......21 
3.1.1. Environmental ODA…………………………………..………………......21 
3.1.2. Historical Trend of Bilateral Environmental Aid to China…..…..…….....22 
3.1.3. Measuring the Possible Loss in Profit……..……...…..………………......22 
3.1.4. Trans-border Air pollution Measure…....……………..………………......24 
3.1.5. Other Control Variables…………………………………..…..…..…….....26 
3.2. Base Model Equation………………………………………...…………….....27 
3.3. Estimation Strategy: Tackling Endogeneity………....…………………….....29 
3.4. Estimation Results………………………...………....…………………….....31 
3.5. Robustness Checks………………………..………....…………………….....32 
4. Extension: Categories of Environmental Aid..……………….…………………...37 
4.1. Decomposition of Environmental Aid……………………………………......37 
4.2. Effect of the Trade Competitiveness Measures of China on PEODA and 
EEODA………………………………………………………………………38 
5. Concluding Comments……………………....……………….……………….…...40 
Appendix…………………...…..……………....……………….…………………....52 
Chapter 2: Pollution-Income Dynamics………………...……………………………55  
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..55 
2. The Model …………………………..…...………...……………………………...56 
3. Conditions for an EKC………………………..…………………………………...62 
4. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...63 
Appendix...…………………………………………………………………………...64 
Chapter 3: Environmental Sustainability with a Pollution Tax …..…………………66  
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..66 
2. Framework of the Analysis……..…..…...………...………………….…………...71 
3. Optimality and Market Clearing Conditions …….………………………………..80 
4. Dynamic equilibirum …...………………………………………………………...82 
5. Economic Growth………..………………………………………………………..86 
6. Conditions for sustinable growth (assuming that 0f = ).…….…...………..……...89 
7. Stock Effects: Conditions for Avoiding an Environmental Disaster …….……….98 

















Chapter 1: Strategic Bilateral Environmental Aid and 
Trans-border Pollution 
1. Introduction 
Trans-border pollution poses a serious challenge to environmental cooperation among 
sovereign states. Only a very small number of binding multilateral international 
environmental agreements have remained successful. Unlike multilateral 
environmental agreements, however, bilateral environmental aid to reduce trans-
border pollution has been much more persistent and successful (Hicks et al., 2008).  
This paper is concerned with bilateral environmental official development 
assistance (EODA) between developed donor and developing recipient countries in 
the presence of trans-boundary pollution. This paper also considers the fact that the 
recipient country may potentially increase competition with donor countries in the 
export markets in part as a result of EODA. This tradeoff may cause donor countries 
to direct their EODA strategically. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical 
analysis of such strategic behavior. The empirical analysis employs a new data set 
developed by the Project Level Aid Database (PLAID) on bilateral EODA for the 
period from 1985-2008 (Hicks et al., 2008).  
The existing literature has recognized strategic behavior among donor countries in 
the context of general official development assistants (GODA) which consists mostly 
of non-environmental aid. Many studies find that GODA is merely an instrument for 




and Nelson, 2012; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2009; 
Johansson and Pettersson, 2009).  
Unlike GODA, however, the donor country experiences a direct environmental 
benefit from EODA if it is associated with reductions in trans-boundary pollution, in 
addition to trade effects caused by changes in trade competitiveness. We focus on the 
relative export performance of both donor and recipient countries and examine two 
types of EODA: (i) EODA that induces energy efficiency, and (ii) “pure” EODA, 
which consist of the transfer of technology that reduces pollution emissions without 
affecting production efficiency (i.e., air purification technology).1  
Theoretical studies postulate that EODA may enhance the welfare of the donor and 
recipient countries by inducing a reduction of trans-boundary pollution (i.e., 
Chambers and Jensen, 2002; Hatzipanayotou et al., 2002; Chao and Yu, 1999; 
Copeland and Taylor, 1995) .Yet these papers do not examine the strategic role of the 
government in determining the composition and levels of EODA, nor do they provide 
insight into identifying  the ways in which certain characteristics of the donor and 
recipient countries affect the amount of EODA granted. 
Little empirical research has been done on this topic. One exception is the research 
conducted by Hicks et al. (2008), which provides detailed data on the time profiles of 
both multilateral and bilateral EODA and examines its determinants. Although Hicks 
et al. (2008) acknowledge the role of international trade in the allocation of 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we do not explicitly consider the case in which the donor promotes exports by offering 
environmental aid. The rationale for this decision is that as long as forceful import from the donor 
country does not comprise a large share of the total import of the recipient from the donor country, the 
market mechanism may induce the recipient country to adjust its import from the donor country. 
Moreover, numerous recent studies on ODA find that “Aid-for-Trade” has actually promoted the 
recipient country’s exports (see, Hühne et al., 2014; Helble et al., 2013). Consequently, we focus 
instead on the effect of environmental aid on bilateral trade competitiveness by considering relative 




multilateral environmentally related aid, they do not examine the causal relationships 
between change in trade competitiveness and EODA. The present study is thus the 
first to provide an empirical estimation of the determinants of bilateral EODA in the 
presence of trans-boundary pollution.  
This study uses a multistage game to examine the aid policy of the donor country. 
The theoretical framework of this paper incorporates factors affecting the donor 
country’s export competitiveness vis-à-vis the recipient country as well as damages 
from trans-border pollution.  
This paper then derives and empirically estimates a set of testable hypotheses on 
the determinants of bilateral EODA from developed donors to China using PLAID’s 
well-defined taxonomy of bilateral EODA from. Although many countries receive 
bilateral EODA from developed nations, China is a natural candidate for our 
theoretical and empirical investigation for the following reasons. First of all, China 
has not only emerged as the largest merchandise exporter in the world, competing 
with developed countries in technology-intensive products, but it has also become one 
of the countries that is most responsible for trans-border air pollution, raising serious 
regional environmental concerns.2 Secondly, a large number of air pollutants move 
from China into other countries or have global implications.3 Thirdly, despite the 
disappointing failure of numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations with 
                                                 
2 For insight into China’s successful industrial transition in recent decades, see Rodrik (2006) and Cui 
and Syed (2007). 
3 Trans-border pollution from China is known to cause serious environmental problems in nearby 
countries as China’s economy continues to expand. Each spring, fierce dust and sand storms take place 
in the Gobi Desert across northern and western China. As the dust and sand are blown eastward by 
westerly winds, they pick up air pollution particles, particularly over heavily industrialized areas in 
northeast China such as Shenyang, and carry them farther east into South Korea and Japan. They even 
move farther east to reach the west coast of the United States. According to emission researchers, half 
of the world’s man-made mercury emissions come from Asia, with China being the main source 




pollution importing countries to resolve trans-border pollution, EODA to China has 
persisted over recent decades. While GODA from developed countries to China has 
declined rapidly since the mid-1990s, EODA to China has remained steadily 
remained at relatively high. China’s data on EODA from OECD countries provides 
the opportunity to examine a set of theoretical propositions on the nature and 
determinants of EODA.  
2. The Basic Model and Testable Hypothesis 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The analysis considers a multi-stage model of EODA and trade competition between 
the donor and recipient countries. We assume that the donor has already accumulated 
a set of technologies that abates pollution. 
l In the first stage, the government of the donor announces whether or not to 
arrange EODA to transfer technology to the country that emits pollution 
across a national boundary. If the government decides to offer aid, it has to 
purchase the technology from the technology-developing domestic firm. 
l In the second stage, the representative firm in the recipient country decides 
on the amount extent to which abatement technologies should be developed.  
l In the final stage, firms from both countries engage in Cournot competition in 
the output market; likewise profits and pollution levels are realized. 
The aid decision of the donor government takes into account the effect the 
abatement technology being transferred has on the development of in abatement 




changes in trade. The aid is not offered if the recipient country is reducing investment 
in abatement technology by more than the amount of aid. 
Production and pollution emissions 
We assume that each country produces a dirty good and a clean good. A dirty good 
emits pollution from its production process while clean good does not. There exists a 
representative firm in the dirty sector in each of the two countries, the donor country 
( N ) and the recipient country ( S ). The two countries compete in the world export 
market for the dirty good.4 Let p  denote the world price of the dirty good. The price 
of the clean good is normalized to unity.  
Let the production and demand for the dirty good of country i  be denoted as iy  and 
( )id p  with ' ( ) 0id p < for ,S, Wi N=  where W denotes the third country (or the rest 
of the world) that does not produce output .y 5 The output price adjusts to clear the 
market instantaneously so that ( ) ( ) ( )N S N S Wy y y d p d p d p= + = + + .
6  Throughout 
the paper, we maintain the following assumption which guarantees the existence of 
Cournot equilibrium in the output market: 
Assumption 1: Let ( )p y  with '( ) 0p y <  denote the inverse world demand for the 
output. Then '( )yp y  is declining in y  or '( ) ''( ) 0p y yp y+ £  for any 0y > . 
                                                 
4 Some dirty goods and services such as electricity and transportation service are mostly non-tradable. 
But they constitute important intermediate inputs for dirty manufactured tradable goods. As the donor 
country is concerned about the effect on competitiveness of environmental aid in the dirty industry, it 
is quite innocuous to assume that the dirty good is tradable in our model economy. 
5 Throughout the paper we use the prime sign to denote the first derivative and double prime to denote 
the second derivative  




The production of one unit of output by firm i  emits ix  units of pollution. The 
pollution of firm i  depends on the level of pollution abatement technology iK  so that 
for ,i N S= : 
( )i ix x K=  with '( ) 0x K < . 
If there exist economies of scale in abatement technology, we have ''( ) 0x K < . 
Otherwise, ''( ) 0x K ³ .  
The government of country i   imposes a pollution tax, it , per unit of pollution and 
the marginal environmental cost of increasing one unit of output is defined as i ixt . 
Costs and profits in the output market  
The marginal production cost is constant with respect to the level of the dirty output. 
However, it is a decreasing function of the level of abatement technology (i.e. capital). 
The marginal cost of the dirty good of representative firms in each country is equal to 
the marginal production cost ( mic ) plus the marginal environmental cost ( i ixt ). More 
explicitly,  
(1)                                             ( ) ( )mi i i i i ic c K x Kt= + . 
For simplicity, we assume that the level of abatement technology is measured by the 
clean output. We also assume that the marginal cost is continuously differentiable 
function of   iK . The profit of each firm i  is, 
(2)                     ( )( , ; ) ( ) ( )i i j i i i i iy y K p y c K y Kp = - -  for , ,i j N S= . 
Assumption 1 with constancy of marginal cost for any level of output assures that 




1985;Gaudet and Salant, 1991). In addition, the outputs of two firms are strategic 
substitutes.  
Environmental damage from pollution 
Let SNx  denote the level of trans-border pollution that originates from S and affects
N . The clean environmental stock of N  can be expressed as:    
(3)                                            N N N N SN SA B x y x y= - - , 
where NB  is the maximum available environmental stock in the absence of pollution 
and SN Sx x£ . The environmental stock is measured in terms of monetary unit.  
2.2 Description of the Three-Stage Game of Technology Transfer 
Two countries engage in a non-cooperative game to reduce trans-border pollution by 
transferring environmental technology. The strategic aid decision of the donor is 
described as the three-stage game under complete information. Let NK be the 
historically given stock of environmental technologies (i.e., number of patents) of the 
donor country that have become available prior to the aid decision. The abatement 
technology of the donor country N  is superior to that of polluting country S  so that 
S NK K< . The polluting country S   is assumed to opt for a technology transfer for 
free from the potential donor. 
In the first stage, the donor country decides on the amount of aid, k , to be given to 
the polluting country, S .7 In the second stage, the aid-receiving firm decides upon the 
total level of abatement technology, SK , to maximize profit in the output market. The 
best response of the recipient firm in the second stage is rationally anticipated and 
                                                 




taken into account by the donor country. It must meet the constraint that 
/ 1SdK dk ³ - , since otherwise EODA does not reduce trans-border pollution. The 
pollution level in the recipient country is represented as ( )S S Sx x K k= + . Let 
( )mS Sc K k+ denote the marginal production cost of the representative firm in the aid-
receiving country, S , when it received aid Nk K£ .  
The profit of the polluting firm in S  becomes, 
(4)                       [ ]( , ; , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ),S N S S N S S S S S Sy y k K p y y c K k y C Kp t= + - + -  
where ( , ) ( ) ( )mS S S S S S Sc K k c K k f K kt t+ = + + +  and ( )SC K  being the cost of 
developing domestic technology with '( ) 0SC K > and ''( ) 0SC K < . In the third stage, 
the two firms compete in the output market, and an equilibrium price and profits are 
determined. The pollution emissions of the two firms are also determined.  
The Cournot equilibrium output of firm ,i N S=  can be written as 
( ( , ), ( , ))i N N N S S Sy c K c K kt t+ , while the corresponding equilibrium output price and 
profits are denoted as ( )( , ), ( , )N N N S S Sp c K c K kt t+  and  
( )( , ), ( , )i N N N S S Sc K c K kp t t+ , respectively. Then, the optimal strategic choice of 
developing SK  of the aid-receiving firm is given as follows: 
( )max ( , ), ( , ),S S N N N S S S SK Arg c K c K k Kp t t= + . 
Since the marginal costs of the two firms, Nc  and Sc , depend on the degree of 
environmental regulations, St  and Nt , the SK  level of the aid receiving firm can be 
written as,  




Then, given the technological capability of the donor, NK  and the environmental 
regulations of each country , Nt  and St , the equilibrium price of the dirty output, 
profits of two representative firms from the North and South, and level of trans-
border pollution from the South depend on the size of aid, k .  
We denote Cournot equilibrium output price and profits as ( ),N Sp y y  and ( ),i N Sy yp  
for ,i N S= , respectively where iy  can be expressed as 
( )( , ), ( ; , , )i N N N S N S Ny c K c k Kt t t  with  ( ; , , ) ( ( ; , , ), )S N S N S N S N Sc k K c k h k Kt t t t t= + .  
2.3 Strategic Objective of the Donor Government 
Although the government of the donor country decides on the scope of bilateral 
EODA to reduce trans-border pollution, it has to consider the cost of aid in the form 
of the possible erosion of competitiveness of domestic firms in the export market.8 
Following the literature on strategic trade and environmental policy, we assume that 
the donor government maximizes domestic welfare, which is given as, 
(5)                                             ,N N N NW Ap a= +  
where Na  represents the political weight on maintaining a clean environment.  
Throughout the paper, we assume that the political weight on the environment for 
each country is known to the other.9 
 
                                                 
8  We ignore the consumer surplus as it is dispersed among a numerous number of unidentified 
individual consumers and does not represent organized pressure for the government. We also ignore 
the effect of aid on the non-tradable sector of the donor country, as the volume of aid is considerably 
smaller than the typical non-tradable sector of the developed economy. Empirical measures for 
competitiveness, which takes into account political pressure from reduced market share in the export 
market, will be discussed in the next section. 
9  Imperfect information regarding the political weight of the aid-recipient country can trigger 
incentives for a reputation for the building of excessive pollution on the part of the recipient country 




2.4 Equilibrium with Technology Transfer 
Let us define the value of environmental aid (VEA ) as the welfare gain of the donor 
country when it offers aid to the polluting country. It consists of changes in domestic 
profits ( DP ) and environmental benefits resulting from the reduced pollution 
emissions of the recipient country ( EB ) that result from bilateral EODA. That is,  
(6)                                                 .VEA EB= DP +  
2.4.1 The Welfare Effect of EODA for the Donor Country 
The effect of aid on the domestic profit of the donor country becomes: 
(7)      
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , ), ( ; , , ) , ( , ), ( ; , , )
      ( , ), (0; , , ) , ( , ), (0; , , )
N N N N N S N S N S N N N S N S N
N N N N N S N S N S N N N S N S N
y c K c k K y c K c k K
y c K c K y c K c K
p t t t t t t
p t t t t t t
é ùDP = ë û
é ù- ë û
, 
where the equilibrium profit of the donor country is given as ( ),i N Sy yp  with 
( )( , ), ( ; , , )i N N N S N S Ny c K c k Kt t t  and  / 0i iyp¶ ¶ =   for ,i N S= . Furthermore,  
(8)                        N N N N S S N S S
N S S S S S
y y c y c
k y c y c k y c k
p p p pæ ö¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + =ç ÷¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶è ø
. 
Since / 0N Syp¶ ¶ <  and / 0S Sy c¶ ¶ <  by Assumption 1, the sign of / k¶DP ¶  (or 
/N kp¶ ¶ ) depends on /Sc k¶ ¶ . When k  varies continuously, we have,  
(9)                        
( ) ( ) ( ; , , )' 1
m
S S S N S N
S
dc k dc k K k Kx
dk dk k
t tt ¶æ ö= + +ç ÷¶è ø
.10 
It follows that unless ( ) / 0mSdc k dk =  and 0St =  , the marginal cost of the 
representative firm in S  decreases in the volume of aid k . As a result, the donor’s 
                                                 
10  Recall that the marginal cost of the firm in the recipient country is 




output and profit decreases in k  under Assumption 1 on strategic substitutes. 
Therefore, the forgone profit,DP , can be interpreted as the social cost of aid. 
Without loss of generality, let the trans-border pollution originating from the aid-
receiving country be given as SN SN Sx xb=  where 0SNb ³  reflects factors that affect 
the magnitude of trans-border pollution, such as direction of wind or geographical 
distance from the polluting country. Then, by using Equation (3), (5) and (7) the 
environmental benefit (EB) of the donor country becomes: 
(10)          
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( , , ), (0; , , ) ( ; , , )) ( (0; , , ))
         ( ; , , )) ( , ), ( ; , , ) ( , ), (0; , , ) ,
N SN S N N S N S N S N S N S N S N S N
N SN S N S N S N N N S N S N S N N N S N S N
EB y c K c K x K k K k x K K
x K k K k y c K c k K y c K c K
a b t t t t t t t t
a b t t t t t t t t
é ùé ù= - + -ë ûë û
é ù- + -ë û
 
Equation (9) implies that the marginal effect of EODA on environmental benefit is 
given as,  
(11) 
( )
( ) ( )
( ; , , ))
( , , ), (0; , , ) ' ( ; , , )) 1
S S




S N N S N S N S N S N S N
y c x K k K k
c kEB




t t t t t t
¶ ¶æ ö+ç ÷¶ ¶¶ ç ÷= -
ç ÷¶ ¶æ ö+ + +ç ÷ç ÷¶è øè ø
 ,  
Since / 0Sc k¶ ¶ £  and / 0S Sy c¶ ¶ <  under Assumption 1, the first term, which 
represents output effect, is negative, implying that EODA may induce the recipient 
country to expand the production of dirty output, thereby increasing the emission 
volume. The second term ( ) ( )' 1 0SS
Ky x
k
¶æ ö+ >ç ÷¶è ø
g g  represents positive emission effect, 




the dirty output. Since EODA causes profit loss in the export market, the following 
proposition is immediate.   
Proposition 1 (condition for existence of EODA). EODA exists only if the output 
effect outweighs the emission effect for some 0k > .  
Proof: In the text.  
Proposition 1 implies that if the output effect outweighs the emission effect for any 
level of 0k > , the potential donor country does not consider bilateral environmental 
aid.   
Regarding the sufficient condition for the existence of EODA, let us assume that 
the marginal profit loss from EODA converges to 0 as the aid volume decreases to 0. 
For example if the output demand is linear in price and marginal production cost of 
the recipient firm is represented as 0( ) ( )
m
Sc k f k c=  with 0lim ( ) 1k f k® =  and '( ) 0f k <  
for 0k > , the condition is satisfied when 0St = .
11  Then, if there exists a positive 
interval of k  over which the emission effect outweighs the output effect, the 
environmental aid emerges, increasing the welfare of the donor country. Figure 1 
illustrates the case that optimal aid *k  exists. We state the following Corollary to 
Proposition 1. 
                                                 
11  When the demand is given as p a by= -  , the Cournot equilibrium output becomes  












 and the condition is satisfied. As an example, we can consider  











. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
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%  with 0k >%  .   





 can be written as, 
(11’)                    
( ) (1 )
S S S
S S
N SN y c c k xk
y x KEB
k k k
a b e e e





e  is the elasticity of dirty output of the recipient country with respect to 
marginal cost of the recipient country; 
Sc k
e  is the elasticity of marginal cost of the 
recipient country with respect to environmental aid ; and xke  is the elasticity of 
emission per unit of output with respect to environmental aid.12 
Since / 0S Sy c¶ ¶ < , and / 0Sc k¶ ¶ £  under Assumption 1 and '( ) 0x K < , it follows 
that 0
S Sy c
e < , 0
Sc k
e £  and 0xke < . The product term S S Sy c c ke e  represents the elasticity 




e ¶æ ö+ç ÷¶è ø
represents the elasticity of emission with respect to aid which in general 
depends on the response of the recipient country to aid, /SK k¶ ¶ . The output 
elasticity is positive while the emission elasticity is negative.  We find that 
/ 0EB k¶ ¶ >  if and only if 1 0
S S S
S
y c c k xk
K
k
e e e ¶æ ö+ + <ç ÷¶è ø
. In other words, the 
environmental benefit to the donor country increases in EODA if emission is 
                                                 




sufficiently elastic so as to be reduced to offset the effect of an increase in dirty 
output. The following remark for Proposition 1 is immediate. 
Remark 1.  If the absolute value of the elasticity of pollution emission in the recipient 
country with respect to EODA is always larger than the elasticity of output of the 
recipient country with respect to EODA, the donor country does not transfer pollution 
abatement technology through EODA.  
2.4.2 Trade Competitiveness and the Size of EODA 
Since both the forgone profit from offering EODA ( DP ) and the environmental 
benefit ( EB ) to the donor country depend on the amount of EODA, k , the socially 
optimum size of aid, *k , is determined at the level that maximizes the value of 
environmental aid (VEA), which can be represented as the function of forgone profit 
and environmental benefit to the donor country. More explicitly,   
(12)                                             [ ]* max ; ,k Arg VEA k EB= DP , 
subject to 0k ³ .  
Assuming an interior solution, * 0k k= > , 
(13)                                0.N N S
S
cVEA EB EB
k k k c k k
p p¶D ¶ ¶¶ ¶ ¶
= + = + =
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
 
Equation (13) states that the marginal cost of aid needs to be balanced against the 
marginal environmental benefit. We assume that the second-order condition for 
interior maximization is also satisfied. 
From the Cournot equilibrium condition, we have,  
          '( )N Np y p y c+ =  and '( )S Sp y p y c+ = , 











0N N S N S SN
S S S N S S
y c c yy
c y c y y c
p p æ ö¶ ¶ ¶ - ¶
= = >ç ÷¶ ¶ ¶ - ¶è ø
,       
From Equation (13) it follows that,  
(13’)                                  0N S S SN
N S S
c c y cVEA EBy
k y y c k k
é ùæ ö- ¶ ¶¶ ¶
= + =ê úç ÷¶ - ¶ ¶ ¶ê úè øë û
. 
Let us define the elasticity of the cross-country output difference (with respect to 
the cost difference) as, 
( )
( ) ( )/ 0.
( )
N S N S
N S N S
d y y d c c
y y c c
æ ö æ ö- -
Y = >ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷- -è øè ø
 
Y measures the proportional change in the output differential between the two 
countries with respect to one percent change in the cost differential between them. It 
is a measure of the capacity of the recipient country to increase its competitiveness in 
relation to the donor country. For example, high Y  implies that a small decrease in 
cost differential caused by the small decrease in Sc  will cost a large increase in output 
differential caused by the expansion of Sy . Therefore, Y  can be regarded as an 
indicator of bilateral trade competitiveness of the recipient country against the donor 
country. It remains always positive since Assumption 1 implies that / 0S Sy c¶ ¶ <  . As 
Y  increases, the marginal social cost of environmental aid increases.  
In the case of linear demand, Y  becomes a positive constant. Equation (13’) can 
now be written as, 
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(15)                                     * ( ; , , , , , )SN N N S Nk F Kb a t t= Y G , 
where SNb  is the effect of trans-border pollution; Na  is the social preference for a 
clean environment of the donor country; Nt  and St  are the stringency of 
environmental regulation of the donor and recipient country respectively; and G  
represents a vector of variables that affect incentives for EODA. It may include 
macro-economic shocks or structural trend of ODA between the donor and recipient 
countries. The following comparative static results are derived from the previous 
analysis. Define the value function,  
(16)                                             ( , ) SN
c EBz k y
k k
¶ ¶
Y = Y +
¶ ¶
. 
Then, ( *, ) 0z k Y =  from Equation (14). Using the second order condition for 
interior maximum of VEA, we know that ( , ) / 0z k k¶ Y ¶ < . Also, we have that 
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. Totally differentiating value function, z , we have,  
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. 
The inequality implies that the optimal level of aid is negatively affected by the 
capacity of the recipient country to increase its competitiveness in relation to the 
donor country.  
We now summarize the previous comparative static analysis in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2.  EODA and Y are inversely related. If the demand is linear in price, 
then Y  becomes a fixed parameter and there exists a negative causal relationship 




Proof: In the text.  
2.4.3 Transferring “pure” Abatement Technology 
So far we have considered EODA to transfer energy efficient pollution abatement 
technology (EET) that may affect the marginal production cost of the firm in the 
recipient country. However, if the abatement technology does not make preventive 
changes in the upstream process to save resources, it is not likely to affect the 
marginal production cost.13  This type of technology may include air purification 
technology and, educational know-how for waste management to reduce air pollution 
emissions and infrastructure management for environmental cleaning, among other 
types of technology. Let us denote such technology as “pure” environmental 
technology (PET) and denote pk   as the amount of PET transfer through bilateral 
EODA.  
We begin the analysis from the case where the recipient country does not regulate 
pollution so that 0St = . Since pollution is not regulated in the recipient country, the 
development of abatement technology by the recipient country is always in the form 
of EET. Therefore, the recipient country does not take into consideration of EODA 
that consists of PET in the second stage of the game (i.e., / 0S pK k¶ ¶ = ).
14 That is, 
when the donor country transfers PET only, the marginal cost of the recipient country 
can be written as, 
( (0) ) ( (0))m mS S p S Sc K k c K+ = . 
                                                 
13 Greaker (2003) presents an example of preventive abatement technology, which requires large, fixed 
costs. It is viable only if the accompanying production technology exhibits substantial scale economies.     
14 For example, the number of patents to save non-renewable resources may not be affected by the 




That is, if 0St = , the marginal cost of the recipient country is not affected by 
transferring PET from the donor country, so that / 0S pc k¶ ¶ = . This implies that the 
forgone profit of the donor country is 0DP = . Thus, the donor’s decision to transfer 
PET depends solely on the environmental benefit of the donor country, which is 
always positive since there is no output effect. More explicitly, Equation (10) 
becomes, 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ,0, ), (0; ,0, ) (0; ,0, ) (0; ,0, ) 0.N SN S N N N S N N S N N p S N N
EB
y c K c K x K K k x K Ka b t t t t
=
é ù- + - >ë û
 
The following proposition is immediate.  
Proposition 3. In the absence of environmental regulation in the recipient country, 
bilateral EODA to transfer PET unambiguously enhances welfare level of the donor 
country. 
Proof: In the text. 
Suppose now that the government in the donor country decides whether it should 
transfer PET or EET through bilateral EODA with a given government budget. Then, 
the decision to transfer PET or EET will hinge on the marginal value of aid to transfer 
each type of abatement technology. For comparison, let us assume that both types of 
technology are measured in monetary terms.  
The marginal value of transferring PET through bilateral EODA can be written as,   
( ) ( )( )( ,0, ), (0; ,0, ) ' (0; ,0, )) 0N SN S N N N S N N S N N p
p
EB y c K c K x K K k
k
a b t t t¶ = - + >
¶
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As in the previous analysis, let us define the marginal value of environmental aid to 





Y = + =
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. 
Then, by using Equation (13), the difference of the marginal value of environmental 
aid from transferring EET and PET can be written as,  
(17)                      ( , ) ( , )p pG z k z k= Y - Y
( )( ) ( ) p
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Given 0St =  and by Equations (11), (16) and (17) we have that  
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where the third term in the bracket on the right hand side of Equation (17’) represents 
the difference in the emission effect caused by transferring PET and EET through 
bilateral EODA.  
Since / 0Sc k¶ ¶ £ , and / 0S Sy c¶ ¶ <  under Assumption 1, the sign of G  evaluated 
at pk k= depends on this relative magnitude of the emission effect from transferring 
two different technologies.  
To determine the sign of G  at pk k= we need further information. In particular, the 
sign of G  depends on the response of the firm in the recipient country in terms of 
developing domestic abatement technology upon receiving EODA (i.e. /SK k¶ ¶ ) and 




development of abatement technology in the recipient country decreases in EODA 
(i.e. ( ) / 0SK k k¶ ¶ < ), and if an increasing returns to scale prevails in abatement 
technology (i.e., ''( ) 0x K < ), then the emission effect of transferring PET dominates 
the emission effect of EET: thus, 0G < . 
We now turn to the case when 0St >  under the assumptions that ''( ) 0x K <  and 
( ) / 0SK k k¶ ¶ <  so that the sign of G  evaluated at pk k=  is negative when 0St = .  
From the definition of ( , )z k Y  and ( , )p pz k Y , we know that 0G <  is continuous in 
St . Then we can rewrite G  as,  
(18)                                              ( ) ( , ) ( , )S p pG z k z kt = Y - Y . 
If 0G <  is continuous in St , there exists a small positive interval, ˆ(0, )St , such that 
for any St  in the interval, ( ) 0SG t < . In other words, for small enough levels of 
pollution tax in the recipient country, the marginal value of bilateral environmental 
aid is greater for PET than that of EET as long as the transfer of PET reduces larger 
amounts of trans-border pollution than EET. We summarize the analysis in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4. Assume that there exist economies of scale in pollution abatement 
technology and the development of new pollution abatement technology in the 
recipient country does not increases as a result of EODA. Then for a sufficiently 
small level of pollution tax in the recipient country, the marginal value of EODA to 
transfer PET is greater than that of EODA to transfer EET .  
Proof: In the text. 




over EET as a type of environmental technology to transfer through EODA. The 
donor offers a greater volume of aid to transfer PET than when the aid consists of 
EET only.     
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we test the empirical implication of Proposition 2. Equation (15) 
implies that the optimum amount of EODA from the donor country to China depends 
on,Ywhich affects the donor country’s domestic profit, NtpD  given other variables 
such as the magnitude of trans-border pollution from China to donor, cNTB  , that 
affects the environmental benefit, EB , of the donor country.  
(19)                                           ( ; , ),Nc cNEODA f TB= Y W  
where W  denotes a vector of control variables including unobserved country-specific 
preference toward a cleaner environment, Na ; the pollution regulation measure of  
China, St  and the donor country, Nt ; the technological capability of the donor country 
that enlarges the set of feasible aid to the polluting country, NK  and structural trend 
that controls for macro-economic shocks.  
3.1. Data  
3.1.1 Environmental ODA  
The Project-Level Aid Database (PLAID) provides project-based EODA data with 
detailed aid contents. This database is regarded as the most recent and consistent data 
source for cross-country ODA grants in general.16 Data on EODA to China as a 
means of technology transfer are quite limited in comparison with GEODA that 
                                                 
16 The PLAID not only offers disaggregate aid data from every project by multiple policy objects but 
also provides information on whether each of the EODA projects involved technical cooperation or 




includes non-environmental aid. In fact, only 19 countries have made an effort to 
transfer their technology and know-how by means of EODA since 1985. Using 
PLAID on bilateral EODA flows, a panel of yearly aggregate EODA flow for each 
donor country (19 OECD countries) can be constructed from 1985 to 2008.  
3.1.2 Historical Trend of Bilateral Environmental Aid to China  
Figure 2 below shows the sum of all bilateral flows of ODA including environmental 
ODA from 19 OECD countries to China. GODA, which consists largely of dirty aid, 
has been decreasing since the mid-1990s, as China’s economic growth has steadily 
continued each decade, beginning in the 1980s. In contrast with the declining dirty 
aid, however, the volume of EODA has increased, even since the early 2000s in 
which China emerged as a leading exporter in the global market.  
3.1.3 Measuring the Possible Loss in Profits 
As shown earlier in the previous section, the possible loss in profits depends on the 
elasticity of the cross-country output difference with respect to the cost difference 
(Y ). In order to obtain a more objective measure of the possible loss in profits in the 
output market, we construct two different measures.  
Given the domestic demands of the donor and recipient countries, Y depends on 
the net export flow of the recipient country to the donor country or any other trade-
related measures of the competitiveness of the recipient country in the export market.  
For this reason, we first consider the net import of the donor country from China. 
As the elasticity of the cross country output difference with respect to the cost 
difference depends on output difference, we expect that this elasticity increases with 




then reflect the threat of forgone profits from offering environmental aid.17 We use 
the net import of the donor country from China as a share of the donor’s GDP, which 
can be obtained from the Direction of Trade (DOT) database of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF, 2010).18  
In addition, as Y  is affected by the export competition between each of the donor 
countries and China, we take the ratio of the market share of China in the donor’s 
market and the market share of the donor in China’s market. For expositional 
convenience we denote this variable as the “relative market share” of China. It can be 












where subscripts N , c  and t  represent donor countries, China, and time, respectively 
cNtExport  refers to the total export volume of China to the donor country at year t ; 
NctExport  is the total export volume from the donor country to China at year t ;
cit
i
Exportå  refers to the total export volume from China to the world and 
Nit
i
Exportå  is total export volume from the donor country to the World. The 
underlying premise is that if the marginal cost of China’s exporting firm decreases 
                                                 
17  We implicitly assume that the recipient firm can utilize new environmental technology more 
efficiently when it has a greater market share in the global market. We can also extend the 
representative firm model in the previous section by incorporating firm heterogeneity. The greater net 
trade surplus of the recipient country then implies a greater number of incumbent recipient firms that 
can benefit from EODA. In addition, EODA may stimulate the new entry of firms in the recipient 
country.  
18 IMF DOT database provides each country’s import and export amount of all goods against China. 
After calculating net trade balance we divide it with respect to each donor country’s nominal GDP in 




relative to firms in the donor countries, China’s relative export performance in 
comparison with that of the donor country in the global market improves.  
Controlling for bilateral trade complementarity  
The estimation bias from using both measures of trade competitiveness as proxies for 
the social cost of aid may be affected by the possible complementary bilateral trade 
relationship between the donor and China. In fact, in the presence of the vertical 
international division of labor between certain donor countries and China, estimation 
results are likely to be biased if we do not control for the trade relationship between 
donors and China. Hoekman et al. (2002) provides trade complementarity index that 
contain useful information on how well the structures of a country’s imports and 
exports match. The index is used to control for a possible complementary bilateral 
trade relationship between the donor and China.19   
3.1.4 Trans-border Air Pollution Measure  
Yellow sand (also known as yellow dust) storms from China have attracted popular 
attention since 1990 as one of the major trans-border air pollutants blowing to other 
countries from China. The frequency of these storms has recently increased, 
damaging Pacific-based countries. It is difficult to obtain scientifically accurate and 
direct measures of the trans-border content of air pollutants such as yellow dust that 
cross border. In this paper, the yearly average SO2 emission level of China is adopted 
as SO2 emissions associated with this dust storms negatively affect the quality of soil, 
biomass and the respiratory system of human body (i.e. Griffin, et al. 2001).  
                                                 




It should be noted that China is located in the middle latitudes between 30 and 60 
degrees. Since this region is under the influence of westerly winds, which blow from 
west to east, pollutants from China also move from west to east.20 Accordingly, the 
wind-weighted distance is adopted in the estimation model. Figure 3 shows the 
direction of westerly wind blowing from west to east.  
Damage from trans-border pollution is measured taking into consideration the 
direction of the wind blowing from China as follows:  
cN cN cTB xb= , 
where 0cNb >  is the wind-weighted distance between China and each donor country, 
and cx  is the air pollution content (i.e., level of SO2 emissions) in China that can 
cross the border of China. For example, for countries located west of China (i.e., 
European countries), we take the sum of the distance from China to the US and from 
the US to each donor country as follows:  
, , *,cN c USA USA Nb b b= +  
where *N  denotes the OECD member country located in the European region.21  
We note that the geographical distance differs from the wind-weighted distance. 
Some European countries are located rather close to China but, are not influenced by 
                                                 
20 China-borne air pollutants travel all the way to the western part of the U.S. due to westerly wind (see 
for example, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/californians-hacking-up-lungs-due-to-china-pollution-
2013-1 for a recent news report).  
21 For Australia and New Zealand, we only take physical distance and do not consider the direction of 




the westerly movement of local pollutants. If, however, they maintain a close 
economic partnership with China, they may have an incentive to offer environmental 
aid to cope with global pollution.  
3.1.5 Other Control Variables 
As a base model, we select the following set of control variables to test Proposition 2.  
1) Degree of the environmental regulation in China ( ct ) and in the donor country ( Nt ): 
In order to capture the degree of environmental regulation, a number of international 
environmental agreements including not only those that have been signed or ratified 
but also those that have entered into effective force are adopted for the estimation. 
The data for different degrees of international agreements over time are taken from 
Mitchell (2012).  
2) Technological capability of the donor country ( NK ): Technological capability for 
reducing air pollution is not well documented in the literature. However, OECD 
(2010) documents the number of filed patents that specifically aims to reduce air 
pollution. We take this measure to gauge the technological capacity to control local 
air pollution.  
3) Country-specific social preference for a clean environment Na : The social 
preference of the donor country measures the trade-off between environmental quality 
and forgone profits. We disaggregate this effect into time varying and time constant 
effects so that Nt N Nta a d= +  where Na  is unobserved donor specific preference 
measure that does not change over time and  Ntd  is the time varying donor specific 




as a proxy measure to capture this effect (i.e., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and 
Dollar, 2004; Hicks et al. 2008). 
4) Time varying structural effect: We also control for time varying structural effects 
by including (i) total bilateral ODA to China (ii) time dummies for all sample years 
and (iii) per capita income of China.  
3.2 Base Model Equation 
After log linearization, Equation (19) is specified follows; 
(20) 1 2 1 3 4 1 5 1
6 1 7 1 8 1 9                    ,
Nct cNt cNt Nct ct Nt
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LnEODA Comp LnTB LnTCI Ln Ln
LnM LnTech LnM LnODA
V V V V t V t
V V V V a h e
- - -
- - -
= + + + +
+ + + + + + +
 
where subscripts N , c  and t  represent the donor countries, China, and time, 
respectively and ( 1,...,9)
j
jV =  are fixed parameters. Thus, NctEODA  is the annual 
aggregate level of environmental ODA from the individual donor country to China in 
year t ; NctComp  is the trade competitiveness measures of China against each donor in 
year t ; 1cNtTB -  is the trans-border air pollution measure from China to the donor 
country in year 1t - ; NctTCI  is the trade complementarity index between each donor 
country and China in year t ; 1ctt -  and   1Ntt -  are the degree of environmental 
regulations for China and each donor county in year 1t - ;  1NtM -  is the GNI per 
capita for each donor country in year 1t - ;  1NtTech -  refers to the accumulated number 
of patents for reducing air pollution for each donor country in year t ;  1ctM -  is the 
GNI per capita for China in year 1t - ; NctODA  is the aggregate volume of ODA from 
all OECD countries to China in year t ;  Na  references the unobservable donor 




environment that are time-fixed; th  is the time effect common to all donor countries 
and Nte  is a random disturbance with the usual desirable properties.
22 
Given these control variables as specified in Equation (20), Proposition 2 implies 
that the estimated coefficient is such that 1 0V <  and is statistically significant.  
To test the hypothesis of Proposition 2, we first run OLS, country fixed, and 
random effects models for the base specification (Equation (20)). The results for OLS, 
country, and random and fixed effects are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. If the equation (20) is correctly specified so that there are neither 
endogeneity issues nor measurement errors, we have efficient and consistent 
estimators. Although the estimated coefficients for net import and trans-border 
pollution are statistically significant and have expected signs as shown in the first two 
rows of Table 2, thereby confirming our prediction from Proposition 2, the estimation 
results may be biased for a number of reasons. In particular, potential econometric 
issues, such as the possible endogeneity of trade competitiveness measures should be 
addressed.     
3.3 Estimation Strategy: Tackling Endogeneity   
Our estimation strategy is geared toward solving the endogeneity from reverse 
causality. Environmental ODA is comprised of transferring PET which affects the 
marginal cost of the dirty outputs in China less severely (PEODA) and transferring 
abatement technology, which affects the marginal production cost of the dirty outputs 
                                                 
22 We use one year lagged values of income, degree of environmental regulations and abatement 




in China more severely (EEODA). When EEODA is offered to China from the donor 
country, it may increase China’s export performance against the donor country given 
that China and the donor country are competing for the dirty good market share, and 
therefore biases estimates of the trade competitiveness measure of China. Thus, the 
estimates of the trade competitiveness measures of China cannot be taken seriously as 
evidence of causality.  
We construct instruments for trade competitiveness measures. Our key idea for 
instrumentation is to model the variation of trade competitiveness measures by 
considering the relative size of the donor’s home market of the goods that donors are 
importing from China. Our assumption is that the China’s export volume to the donor 
country (with which she potentially competes) depends on the donor country’s market 
size.  
One of the proxy variables for relative market size is the relative country size of the 
donor and China. The larger the donor is relative to the recipient, the more sales the 
recipient is likely to make; thus, the ratio of the donor population to that of China 
may be a good proxy for relative market size. In addition, the relative size effect is 
likely to be particularly pronounced when China is less resistant to trade with donors. 
We capture this channel by including the interaction between the relative size of the 
population and such trade resistant variables as physical distance, past colonial 
history and free trade regional dummies.  
The information content of our instrument regarding the trade competitiveness 
measures of China over the donor can be examined by depicting the relationship 




To do this we first run the following equation for both types of trade competitiveness 
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where cNtComp  is the trade competitiveness measures of China against the donor 
country;  ctPop  is the size of population of China in year t ; DtPop  is the size of the 
population of the donor country D  in year t ; cDdist  is the physical distance between 
China and donor country D ; colony  is the dummy variable that is equal to1 if China 
had been a colony of donor country D ; Euro  and Asia  are regional dummies that 
capture cultural difference among regions; and tc  is the vector of year dummies from 
1985 to 2008.  
After controlling the effects of other covariates included in Equation (21) the 
relationships between actual and fitted trade competitiveness measures of China are 
positive and statistically significant. 23  Our instrument appears to contain a non-
negligible amount of exogenous information about both measures of trade 
competitiveness of China.  
3.4 Estimation Results  
A. The basic IV results 
We now present estimates for the fixed country effects using instrumental variables. 
In models 1 and 3 of Table 3, we present estimation results of the second stage of the 
                                                 
23 The coefficient is 0.021 and is statistically significant at 10% confidence level for the relative market 
share of China against donor. Also the coefficient is 0.027 and is statistically significant at 10% 




instrumental variable specification, which is representative of the results that we 
obtained more broadly. The equations are reasonably specified, as many of the 
standard covariates show expected signs and statistical significance. In particular, the 
estimated coefficients for both trade competitiveness measures of China over the 
donor country is negative and statistically significant at 1% level which confirm our 
prediction from Proposition 2 and assure that EODA is indeed strategically 
distributed to China as it decreases the trade competitiveness measures of the 
recipient country against the donor. 
B. Validity of instruments: exclusion restriction  
Let us now turn to possible concerns about our instruments. First of all, do they 
satisfy the exclusion restriction; that is, are they plausibly exogenous? In our 
framework, the relative population may be correlated with bilateral EODA in other 
ways, rather than through the trade competitiveness measures of China. For example, 
the donor may wish to “influence” China through bilateral EODA which can be 
captured by the relative population size of the donor country in comparison with 
China. In this case the exclusion restriction may not be satisfied (i.e. Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008).  
One way to examine whether our relative population variable passes the exclusion 
restriction is to simply include the variable directly in the second stage. As shown in 
Table 4, the estimated coefficients of both trade competitiveness measures of China 
are not significantly altered and we do not find a consistent pattern of the relative 




A second check is to see whether our instrument passes over identification tests. 
For this reason, we perform a Hansen test for over identification for model 1 and 3. 
The null hypothesis for this test is that the over-identification restrictions are valid. As 
reported in Table 3, the p-value for Hansen J statistics rejects the null hypothesis, 
increasing our confidence that our instrument set is appropriate.  
3.5 Robustness Checks 
Omitted variable bias 
Omitted variable bias is an important potential issue in the specification of 
Equation (20). If a relevant variable is omitted, it will be absorbed in the error term, 
which leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. The panel estimation model with 
country fixed effects will account for time invariant omitted variables. Time varying 
omitted variables make up the major challenging issue. If a time varying omitted 
variable, such as the natural capital of the donor country, negatively correlates with 
net import volume from China, but positively correlates with EODA, then the 
coefficient of the net import as a share of GDP will be biased downward. We employ 
the Altonji (2005) methodology, which is known as Added Controls Approach (ACA), 
where we control for several other variables and see whether the coefficient of 
interest changes. 
Studies have shown that several factors may directly or indirectly affect GODA. 
Despite the fact that the motivation for bilateral EODA is different from GODA, 
factors that affect GODA may also affect decision of donor countries’ government to 
transfer bilateral EODA. We address this issue by including several time varying 




aid from the literature (i.e. Lumsdaine, 1993; Alesina and Dollor, 2000; Hicks et al., 
2008). We choose degree of democracy of the donor, the volume of natural capital of 
the donor, the donor’s domestic pollution level, the population size for both the donor 
and China; the population density of the donor; the donor’s public expenditure on 
R&D to protect the environment, and 19 OECD donor’s total environmental aid. We 
add a set of variables representing each of the determinants listed above in sequence 
into the fixed country effect estimation presented in Table 3 to test the robustness of 
the variable of interest. Table 5 shows the coefficients of both trade competitiveness 
measures of China and trans-border pollution measure as each control is added. An 
increase in the adjusted R-squared relative to the base estimations implies that 
inclusion of the additional set of controls raises the explanatory power of the model. 
If the coefficient of both trade competitiveness measures and the trans-border 
pollution measure retains the sign and significance, the estimated coefficients are 
stable and robust in the face of the additional regressors.  
Table 5 shows that the coefficients of both measures of trade competitiveness of 
China and the trans-border pollution measure are largely unaffected by the additional 
control variables. The estimated coefficients for both measures of trade 
competitiveness have negative signs and statistically significant at 1 % level. In 
particular, variables such as OECD’s total environmental ODA, population of the 
donor country and donor country’s domestic pollution raise the adjusted R squared of 
both model 1 and model 3 of Table 3. For some variables such as openness, degree of 
democracy and the population density of the donor country, the adjusted R squared is 




remained the same. Considering the potential controls presented in Table 5, we can 
conclude that the results in Table 3 are robust to potentially omitted variables that 
correlate with these sets of variables.    
Dominance test  
Easterly (2004) contends that many cross-sectional regression results are driven by a 
small number of outlier observations. In order to address this issue, we drop both the 
top 1% and the bottom 1% observations of the dependent variable (log environmental 
ODA) and the variable of interest (trade competitiveness measures) and re-estimate 
the country fixed effects with year dummies in Table 3. The results are presented in 
Table 6. The signs of the coefficients for both trade competitiveness measures of 
China are negative and have at least 5% level of significance for all of the sample 
alterations for fixed country effects with IVs. These results imply that the base results 
are not driven by the outliers. 
Misspecification 
Aside from the possibility of reverse causality, econometric specification of the base 
model (Equation (20)) may produce errors due to misspecification. In particular, since 
the aid data consist of country-specific time series data, these data may be serially 
correlated and the correlated part of the error term can affect the effects of covariates 
of major explanatory variables. 
In the presence of serial correlation, one possible means of tackling this issue is to 
recognize the clusters involved in the panel regression and to correct the standard 




the diagnostic test as a problem rather than as an invitation to re-specify the model to 
include the omitted dynamics in the estimated part of the model and thus to exploit 
this additional information in estimation. This argument has recently been strongly 
supported by King and Roberts (2012) in a study of robust standard errors. 
Accordingly, a potentially more interesting solution is to estimate a dynamic panel 
model. 
We consider a dynamic panel model where the country-specific dependent variable 
is influenced by its own lagged value. We use the system GMM estimators first 
proposed by Arelloano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Instead of 
using the seemingly exogenous instruments, the Arellano-Bond system GMM 
estimator uses lagged values of the trade competitiveness measures. This approach 
makes endogenous variables pre-determined, and they are, thus, not correlated with 
the error term in the above equation. The system GMM uses first-differences to 
transform Equation (20). Through this transformation, the fixed country-specific 
effect is removed since it does not vary with time.24 
After log linearization for dynamic panel estimation, we have,  
(22) 
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24 The system GMM is known to have the potential for obtaining consistent parameter estimates even 
in the presence of measurement error and endogenous right-hand-side variables. For validity, using 





where 1itEODA -  denotes a one-year lag of the dependent variable.  
The estimation results for Equation (22) are presented in Table 7. The estimation 
results re-confirm Proposition 2. In particular, we find that EODA is negatively 
affected by China’s relative trade competitiveness measures against OECD donors. 
Moreover, the lagged dependent variable is statistically insignificant implying that 
there are no significant dynamic effects. The Hensen test indicates that the 
instruments are exogenous, and no second order correlation is found.  
4. Extension: Categories of Environmental Aid 
Proposition 4 implies that in the cases in which Chinese firms are regulated by its 
government, the net benefit of aid to transfer PET is greater than that of transferring 
EET. This fact may imply that China’s trade competitiveness measures may 
negatively affect the volume of bilateral environmental aid more if it contains only 
EET rather than PET. In this section, we extend our empirical analysis by employing 
disaggregated environmental ODA data to test and confirm Proposition 2 using the 
empirical implication of Proposition 4.   
4.1 Decomposition of Environmental Aid 
As PLAID codes each component of bilateral environmental aid by aid-receiving 
sectors, we can disaggregate EODA into two different categories, namely, aid that 
affects production costs more directly and aid that does not directly affect production 
costs. Table 1 presents environmental aid by its receiving sectors. It is assumed that if 
environmental aid was transferred to such sectors as Transport and storage, Energy 
generation and supply, Agriculture, forestry and fishing production, and Industry, 




of the aid-receiving firms more directly, and is classified as energy efficiency 
enhancing environmental ODA (EEODA), which transfers abatement technologies 
other than PET. All other types of environmental aid are assumed not to directly 
affect the marginal production costs of the individual polluting firms and are 
classified as pure environmental ODA (PEODA), which transfers PET. PEODA 
includes types of aid that can be treated as public inputs such as the general education 
of technical personnel, the improvement of air purification technology and health 
services. 
Figure 4 shows that EEODA seems to be more volatile reflecting cyclical business 
conditions. In fact, EEODA has declined more rapidly than PEODA over time since 
the mid-1990s, confirming the conjecture that EEODA tends to decline as China 
becomes more competitive in the global export markets.25 Apparently, the volume of 
PEODA does not co-move with EEODA. Due to the public good character of 
PEODA, factors affecting aid effectiveness, such as the stringency of China’s 
regulatory measures, are likely to influence PEODA more seriously than EEODA.  
4.2 Effect of the Trade Competitiveness Measures of China on PEODA and 
EEODA 
One of the efficient ways of comparing the slopes of the trade competitiveness 
measures of China for different dependent variables is to estimate both equations 
simultaneously, assuming that the error terms for both equations are correlated.  
Then Equation (20) then becomes, 
                                                 
25 It is worth noting that the intellectual property rights of environmental technology have never been 
strictly enforced in China, while the number of patent filings for environmental technology by patent 
holders, such as the Japanese, American, or European companies in Africa and other developing 
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We jointly estimate Equation (23) and (24) using three-stage least square estimation 
method with an auxiliary equation for the trade competitiveness measures of China. 
Based on our analysis, we expect 1n  and 1w  to be negative and 1 1n w< . The results 
are presented in Table 3 model 2 and model 4.  
The estimated coefficients of both trade competitiveness measures of China for 
both EEODA and PEODA are negative. Also, as expected from the theoretical model, 
the estimated coefficient for EEODA in the system is greater in absolute value than 
that for PEODA.26 Results from a formal test to check whether the two coefficients 
are different ensure that the effect of both trade competitiveness measures of China in 
each of the PEODA and EEODA equations are not the same.27 In fact, this finding 
not only confirms our theoretical prediction but also renders one possible explanation 
as to why EEODA from each donor country has decreased over the past three decades 
while PEODA has been increasing steadily.  
Since the profit loss from PEODA is smaller than from EEODA, PEODA is likely 
to increase more elastically with trans-border pollution if both types of aid are equally 
                                                 
26 In the previous section, we explain that in the presence of environmental regulations in China, 
PEODA can have a less significant effect on the marginal cost of China’s exporters than EEODA. 
27 Two equations (model 2 and model 4) were estimated jointly using country fixed three stage least 
square to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the trade competitiveness measure is equal. The 
P-value of Chi squared test statistics (cross equation restriction) that the effect of each of the trade 
competitiveness measure is equal in both model 2 and 4 is 0.016 and 0.009 implying that the difference 





effective at reducing trans-border pollution. The estimation results show that PEODA 
is more strongly influenced by trans-border pollution than EEODA.28  
5. Concluding Comments 
This paper derives an empirically testable set of propositions related to the 
determinants of environmental aid as a non-market solution for trans-border pollution. 
The donor country balances environmental benefits against the costs of aid of the 
donor country that result in the potential erosion of their export competitiveness in the 
global market of the donor country. The bilateral trade balance of the donor country 
against the recipient country is shown to significantly affect the volume and 
composition of bilateral EODA. 
The flow of bilateral EODA from OECD countries to China in recent decades 
reflects the effects of trade competition and trade volume on environmental 
bargaining. Various types of sensitivity analysis, including an added control approach 
and dominance test, support the paper’s theoretical proposition that trade competition 
adversely affects environmental aid.  
In addition, the decomposition of environmental aid into energy efficiency 
improving aid and pure environmental aid enables the estimation of simultaneous 
equations with which to test proposition 2. The estimation result implies that trade 
competition or threat of competition significantly reduces EEODA that potentially 
enhances the export competitiveness of the recipient country. Unlike EEODA, 
however, PEODA is relatively less affected by China’s trade competitiveness.   
                                                 
28 The P-value of Chi squared test statistics (cross equation restriction) that the effect of trans-border 
pollution measure is equal in both model 2 and 4 is 0.000 and 0.000 implying that the difference in 




The empirical analysis of this paper suggests that bilateral EODA as a non-market 
solution has a limited role. Despite increasing trans-border pollution and trade volume 
between the donors and China, EEODA have slowed down. However, PEODA is 
increasing over time. This trend may reflect that donor countries are reconciling 
growing environmental concerns with equally growing concerns about trade 
competitiveness with respect to China. As the scope of environmental aid that 
improves China’s energy efficiency is limited by trade competition, the change in 
composition of bilateral EODA may reflect a means by which a solution to the trans-


















Figure 1. Condition for the existence of EODA  
 
Table 1. Classification of sectors that receive two different types of 
environmental aid   
Type of Environmental Aid 
Aid receiving sectors 
EEODA PEODA 
Transport and storage Education 
Energy generation and supply Health 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
production 
Population policies / programs and 
reproductive health 
Industry, mining and construction Water sanitation 
 Government and civil society 
 Conflict prevention and resolution , 
peace and security 
 Banking and financial services 
 Business and other services 
 Communication and media 
 Banking and financial services 







Figure 2. ODA from 19 OECD donors to China  
 
Source: PLAID, OECDdata, and author’s calculation 
 
Figure 3. Direction of Westerly wind 
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Figure 4. Yearly Average of PEODA and EEODA from 19 OECD donors to 
China, 1985-2008.  
 
 























































Table 2. OLS , Random effects and Fixed effects without using IVs.  
 




Dependent variable  Log (Environmental ODA) 
    


















Log(Cumulative number of ratified environmental regulation entered 







Log(Cumulative number of ratified environmental regulation entered 













Log(Cumulative number of filed patents regarding air pollution, year 





0.499*   
[0.281] 












Breusch and Pagan LM test (P- value)   0.00  
Hausman test (P value)    0.01 
Number of observations 245 245 245 
Number of countries  19 19 19 
R-squared 0.64  0.67  0.58  



























Table 3. Country Fixed Effects with IV.  
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Dependent variable  LnEODA LnPEODA LnEEODA LnEODA LnPEODA LnEEODA 
Net Import of the donor 







   
Relative export share of 
China 




-3.467**   
[1.479] 
Log(SO2 china*wind 





























of ratified environmental 
regulation entered into 















of ratified environmental 
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GNI per capita, Donors  













Log(number of filed 
patents regarding air 
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Log (19 Donor’s total aid 













       
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (P- value)  0.38   0.32   
Chi sq-Test on 
competitiveness slope   
H0: Slopes are equal (P-
value)  
 0.000  0.002 
Observations   245 112 112 245 112 112 
Number of countries  19 19 19 19 19 19 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.58 0.14 0.47 
Note: 1) *,**, *** denotes significance level in 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 2) List of countries is 
provided in the appendix. 3) Overall system adjusted R-squared value for estimation models (model 2 















Table 4. Validity of instrumental variable   
 
 Model5 Model6 
Dependent variable  LnEODA LnEODA 
Net Import of the donor (% GDP)  -0.460** 
[0.207] 
 
Relative export share of China  -3.367**  
[1.535] 




Number of countries  19 19 
Observation  245 245 
 Note: 1) The specification is exactly as in table 2, model 1 and model 3, except for the addition of log 
of relative population of Donor over China. 2) Robust standard errors in bracket.3) * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%.. 
 




















Table 5. Added controls approach    









Base  -0.470*** 
[0.080] 










Natural capital  
(Log fresh water per 







Donor pollution  
(Donor’s Log Co2 
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Table 6. Extreme Observation Dominance Fixed country effects with IV 
A. Net import over GDP  
Dominance Test Net import over GDP  
 Bottom 1% 
dropped 
Top 1% dropped Top 1% and 
bottom 1% 
dropped 
Observation dropped of 







Observation dropped of 







Note: Significance at *10%;**5%; 1%, Robust standard errors used. 
B. Relative market share of China over donor  
Dominance Test Relative market share of China over donor 
 Bottom 1% dropped Top 1% dropped Top 1% and bottom 
1% dropped 
Observation dropped of 







Observation dropped of 



















Table 7. System GMM estimation  
 Model7 Model8 
Dependent variable  LnEODA LnEODA 




Net import of the donor (% GDP)  -0.385** 
[0.154] 
 
Relative export share   -1.023*  
[0.580] 








Log(Cumulative number of ratified environmental regulation 





Log(Cumulative number of ratified environmental regulation 

























Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (P-value) 0.081 0.340 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (P-value) 0.869 0.461 
Hansen test (P- value)  0.63 0.21 
Observations   211 211 
Number of countries  18 18 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 2) Robust standard errors in 







Derivation of Equation (10’) 
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Derivation of Equation (17)  
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Proof of Proposition 4.  
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Table A1-Data description and source    
Variable  Description   Source  
EODA Environmental ODA(Million 
US $) 
aidData.org (2010) 
PEODA Log Less cost affecting 
environmental ODA amount 
(Million US $) 
aidData.org (2010)  
EEODA More cost affecting 
Environmental Technology 
ODA amount (Million US $) 
aidData.org (2010)  
Comp Net import of the donor 
country from China/GDP 
IMF Direction of  Trade 
(DOT)  (2010) 
 Market share of China in the 
donor country / Donor’s market 
share in China 
IMF Direction of  Trade 
(DOT)  (2010) 
TCI Log Trade complementary 
Index 
UN comtrade & 
Author’s calculation 
cNTB  Transborder pollution from 
China  
(Wind-weighted distance * 
SO2 emissions in china)  
Smith et al.(2011) & 
Author’s calculation 
ct  China’s cumulative  number of 
international environmental 
treaties that are ratified and 
entered into force 
Mitchell (2012). 
Nt  Donor’s cumulative  number of 
international environmental 
treaties that are ratified and 
entered into force 
Mitchell (2012) 
cM  China’s GNI per capita OECD (2010) 
NM  Donor’s GNI per capita  OECD (2010) 
NTech  Air pollution reducing 
technology patent count 
cumulative 
OECD (2010)  
DcODA   Sum of all ODA for 19 OECD 
donor countries  
aidData.org (2010) 
Natural capital  Log fresh water per capita OECD (2010) 
ctPop  China’s population  OECD (2010) 
DtPop   Donor’s population IMF Direction of  Trade 
(DOT)  (2010)  
cDdist  Distance between China and 










Degree of political freedom 







Public spending on the R&D to 




Sum of 19 OECD donor’s  
environmental aid 
aidData.org (2010) 
Openness  Log total export +import/ GDP OECD (2010) 
Population density Log donor’s population density  OECD (2010) 
 
 
List of countries  
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherland, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 

























Table A2-Summary statistics     
 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
LogEODA 15.05 2.44 4.74 20.45 
LogPEODA 14.71 2.62 4.74 20.45 
LogEEODA 13.77 2.62 6.97 20.10 
Net import of Donor 
country from China / GDP 
-0.05 1.10 -9.01 6.59 
Relative market share of 
China  
-0.66 0.79 -2.9 1.69 
Log TCI 4.24 0.09 3.78 4.42 
Log (Cumulative 
environmental regulations 
entered into force, donor)  
3.77 0.36 2.77 4.36 
Log (Cumulative 
environmental regulations 
entered into force, China) 
3.31 0.12 2.99 3.43 
Log (So2emission * Wind 
distance) 
19.49 0.64 17.21 20.35 
Log (GNI per capita, donor) 9.93 0.57 7.75 11.37 
Log (GNI per capita, China)  8.67 0.57 7.72 9.64 
Log (relative population of 
the donor)  
0.33 0.42 0.10 2.55 
Log (fresh water per capita) 2.11 1.27 0.39 4.97 
Log (Population, donor)  4.02 5.14 1.18 27.32 
Population, China 7.09 0.07 6.95 7.18 
Log (Sum of 19 OECD 
donor’s  total ODA) 
17.23 1.87 11.31 22.46 
Degree of political freedom 
index (polity 3) 
0.48 0.09 0.22 0.71 
Public spending on the 
R&D to protect the 
environment as a share of 
GDP(%) 
2.52 1.50 0.14 15.99 
OECD total Environmental 
aid 
19.85 0.85 15.69 20.81 
Log ((total export +import)/ 
GDP) 
3.41 0.48 2.08 4.52 










Chapter 2: Pollution-Income Dynamics 
Coauthor: Ramón E. López 
 
1. Introduction 
We examine the relationship between pollution and income in a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework with endogenous growth in a multi-output context. Previous 
theoretical literature has assumed a single final good thus ignoring the output 
composition effect and has often modeled production using a Cobb-Douglas 
specification (i.e., López, 1994; Stokey, 1998; Andreoni and Levinson, 2001; 
Johansson and Kriström, 2007). However, empirical evidence shows that the structure 
of consumption, not merely its level, is important in affecting the pollution-income 
relationship (Grossman and Krueger, 1995), and the Cobb-Douglas specification is 
often rejected (Chirinko, 2008). Figueroa and Pasten (2013) is one of the few 
analyses that allow for more general functional forms for consumer preferences and 
production functions. While their analysis constitutes an important generalization of 
earlier models in several respects, it is static in the sense that output expansion is 
exogenous and it still considers only one final consumer good, thus neglecting the 
output composition effect.  
The most important conclusion of the existent theoretical literature is that the so-
called environmental Kuznets process (EKC), where pollution first increases with 
income but beyond a certain income level it secularly declines, constitutes a plausible 
description of the pollution-income relationship. That is, the limits to growth would in 
this case be overcome. Below we show that this optimistic conclusion requires rather 




temporal and inter-temporal, and/or production technologies must have a high degree 
of flexibility for an EKC to be a relevant for an economy that taxes pollution 
optimally.        
2. The Model  
The economy produces two goods: a clean and a dirty one. The dirty-good production 
generates pollution as a byproduct while production of the clean good involves no 
pollution. Let k  denote the total man-made composite clean input available at time t . 
The composite input includes human and physical capital. Henceforth, we refer to k  
as capital, which is momentarily distributed between the clean industry and dirty 
industry. Let dk  denote the amount of capital employed in the dirty sector. The flow 
of pollution from the dirty sector is represented by x. Following López (1994), and 
Copeland and Taylor (2005), we regard pollution as a factor of production, its price 
being determined by a pollution tax. Let ( , )dF k x represents the production 
technology of the dirty-good sector, which is characterized by the constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function,  
(1)                                 ( )
1 1 1
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, 
where w  represents the elasticity of substitution between capital and pollution. The 
dirty sector produces only final goods. The output of the clean-good sector is assumed 
to depend only on the capital input and is governed by the linear technology 
(2)                                                    ( )c dy A k k= - .   
This sector produces the final good and new capital. If we normalize the price of 




(3)                                 ( )( ) ,d dk A k k pF k x c kd= - + - -& , 
where /d cp p pº is the relative price of the dirty good, c dc c pcº + is the total-
consumption expenditure expressed in units of the clean good, d is the rate of capital 
depreciation, and /k dk dtº& is the net capital accumulation. The sum of the first two 
terms on the right-hand side on (3) represents the income of the economy expressed 
in units of the clean good. The gross capital accumulation, k kd+& , is equal to net 
savings (income less consumption), also in units of the clean good.29  
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, 
where c  denotes the total-consumption expenditure, (1, )e p is the unit (dual) 
expenditure function or cost-of-living index, and a  is a parameter that is equal to the 
elasticity of marginal utility (EMU).30 The indirect utility function is assumed to be 
increasing and strictly concave in c . 
The consumer’s underlying preferences are described by a CES utility 
function so that the unit expenditure function is given as 
1
1
1(1, ) c de p p
ssg g --é ù= +ë û , 
where s  is the consumption elasticity of substitution between a dirty good and clean 
good, and 0cg >  and 0dg >  are fixed parameters. Consumer demand for the clean 
good cc  and dirty good dc  can be retrieved from the indirect utility function using 
                                                 
29 We assume that investment in capital is irreversible. Once the economy builds capital, it cannot be 
transformed back into consumption goods. 
30 If 1a < we adopt a positive utility scale such that 0 u< < ¥ , while we scale the utility index to 




Roy’s identity. The optimal level of c  is determined by the inter-temporal 
optimization, as detailed below. We assume for analytic convenience that the 
environmental damage is separable with consumption in consumer welfare, and can 










, where h >0 is a fixed parameter. Then the consumer’s 
instantaneous welfare is  
1 11 ,
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where a  is the elasticity of marginal utility of income (EMU).  
We assume that the discount rate r  is fixed. When the government regulates 
pollution emissions in an optimal way, the competitive economy behaves “as if” it 
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subject to the budget constraint (3), and the initial condition 0k k= . The consumer 
chooses the levels of c  and x  at each point in time. The government imposes a 
pollution tax in a socially optimal way and reimburses the tax revenue in a lump-sum 
way to the consumer. The above optimization implies the following current-value 
Hamiltonian function, 
[ ]
1 11 ( ) ( , )
1 (1, ) 1
a
d d
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The following first-order conditions to the optimization program are 
necessary: 
(4)                                                     1(1, )a ae p c l- - = , 
(5)                                                   ( )1 , 0dpF k x A- = ,  
(6)                                                 1 2( ) ( , ) 0dv x pF k xl- + = , 
(7)                                                    [ ]A Ml r d
l
= - - - = -
&
, 
(8)                                            ( ) ( , )d dk A k k pF k x c kd= - + - -& , 
(9)                                                     lim→  () = 0, 
where a subscript number reflects the first derivative with respect to the 
corresponding argument in functions of more than one variable. The optimal pollution 
tax is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between the pollution and 
consumption expenditure, and is thus 1( ) /v xt lº .  
Using Roy’s identity, we can derive the consumer demand for the dirty good from 












. We then have the following 
market clearing condition for the dirty good:  
(10)                                        ( ) 1, ,dd
c d









while the rate of growth of production of the dirty good is  
(11)                                           ( )
^
ˆ ˆ, dd k
kF k x S x
x






Noting that the market for the dirty good must clear at all points in time, it follows 
that the growth-rate of production and demand for the dirty good must be equal (i.e., 
ˆˆ ( , )d dc F k x= ) . Hence, using Lemma 2, (1) and (11), we arrive at 
(12)                                           
^
ˆ ˆdk
k Mzp S x
x a
æ ö+ + =ç ÷
è ø
 , 
where ( ) (1 ( ))s pz s p
a
sº + - >0.  
From (5), we also have that 1̂ˆ ( , ) 0dp F k x+ = ,  
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Finally, differentiating the (6) with respect to time, we obtain 
(14)                                           
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The equation system (12), (13), and (14) simultaneously solves for the three 
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.31 
Equation (15) implies that the price of dirty goods continuously increases over time 
if the economy has sufficiently strong growth potential ( A r d> +  or, equivalently, if
0M > ). This is partly due to the fact that, under optimal regulation, the price of the 
dirty good depends on the marginal social cost of pollution 1( ( ) / )v x l , which, at the 
given level of pollution, is increasing over time as l  falls. The increasing price of the 
dirty good induces consumers to increase the clean-good–dirty-good consumption 
ratio. This triggers a structural change in production and leads to the output-
composition effect, where production of the dirty good declines relative to that of the 
clean good.         
Equation (16) shows that the so-called technique effect takes place along the 
optimal-growth path. Thus, (15) and (16) imply that closed economy must rely on 
both the output composition and technique effects as a way to counter the scale effect 
caused by positive economic growth. The net result which is described by (17) is, in 
general, ambiguous and critically dependent on the dynamics of ( )s p  and kS (p), in 
                                                 
31 The share of the dirty good in the consumer budget, ( )s p , is an increasing (decreasing) function of 
p  if 1s <  ( 1)s > . The factor share of capital in the production of dirty goods, ( )kS p , is 




addition to the consumption elasticity of substitution,s , the production elasticity of 
substitution,w , and EMU.  
An important issue is whether the dynamic path described by (15) to (17) allows 
for a positive rate of consumption growth.  Proposition 1 below shows that this is 
indeed the case.  
Proposition 1: (i) The growth rate of real consumption expenditure is: 
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^
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e a
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where p̂  is given by (14). (ii) The rate of growth of real 
consumption remains positive throughout the equilibrium path for any positive w  
and s . 
Proof: See Appendix.  
3. Conditions for an EKC 
Sufficient conditions for the emergence of EKC can be summarized as follows. 
Proposition 2: Assume 0a > , then pollution emissions increase over a certain 
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Proposition 2 states that if the economy lacks flexibility in both consumer 
preferences and input substitution, an EKC is not feasible. If EMU is less than one the 
likelihood for the emergence of an EKC is low. In this case at least one of the 
elasticities of substitution must be much greater than one. The popular specification 
where both consumer preferences and production technologies are Cobb-Douglas 
may be consistent with an EKC process only if the EMU is greater than one, which is 
precisely the assumption made by most of the EKC literature (i.e., Stokey, 1998).  
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines the scale, composition, and technique effects of economic 
growth on pollution emission growth. This paper shows that the limits to growth can 
be eluded through a Kuznets-type process only if there is a sufficient degree of 
substitution flexibility in either production technology or consumer preferences. The 
flexibility requirements are more demanding the lower is the EMU. If an economy is 
endowed with such flexibility, then economic growth can be sustained at positive 
levels while pollution falls over the long run. If the elasticity of substitution between 
the dirty inputs and the clean inputs is much less than unity, as often reported in the 
empirical literature, the feasibility of sustainable growth under optimal pollution tax 
hinges greatly on the size of the output composition effect, an effect that has been 










Proof of Proposition 1 
(ⅰ) By Roy’s identity, the demand for the dirty good 2 (1, )(1, )d
cc e p
e p
= . Using 
Shephard’s  lemma, 2ˆ ˆ ˆ(1, ) ( )pee p p s p p
e
= = .  
Therefore, [ ]
^
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )c c e M s p p
e a
æ ö = - = -ç ÷
è ø
.  
(ⅱ) The real consumption grows over time if ˆ / ( )p M s p< .  Using (15) this 
inequality holds if   
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Rearranging this inequality we have the following; 
(A1) [ ](1 ) 1 ( ) (1 )(1 )k k k kS s p S z S Sa
h h h wæ ö- + < - + + +ç ÷
è ø
. 
Since, ( ) 0k kS Sh w+ >  and 
( ) (1 ( ))s pz s p
a
sº + - , (A1) is satisfied if  
(A2) ( ) ( )( ) 1 (1 ( )) .s p s ps p s p
a a
h h sh+ < + + - (A2) holds if 0 (1 ( ))(1 )s p sh< - + , 
which is always true for 0 ( ) 1s p< < . Thus, we have ˆ ( / ( ))p M s p<  and hence 
consumption growth is positive for all finite 0s >  and 0w > . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 




w é ù> ê úë û





= - <  and 
0






æ ö= - -ç ÷
è ø
, EKC can emerge as long as 
11,Min
a








w é ù< ê úë û















æ ö= - -ç ÷
è ø







æ ö= - <ç ÷
è ø
 if  either 11
a
s< <  or 
1 1
a
s< < .  
(ⅲ)  If 1w = , kS  remains equal to some value 0 1a< < .  








and ( )s p  decreases to 0 overtime. EKC can 
emerge since 
, ( ) 0













æ ö= -ç ÷
è ø
>0.  








 and ( )s p  decreases to 0 overtime. Since 







æ ö= - <ç ÷
è ø
 and 
, ( ) 0






= - - - < . The pollution level 




Chapter 3: Environmental Sustainability with a Pollution 
Tax 




This paper examines the feasibility of environmentally sustainable economic 
growth in a dynamic general equilibrium framework of a closed economy with two 
final outputs and two factors of production. It explicitly accounts for both pollution 
flow effects and the existence of irreversible thresholds affecting the stock of 
renewable natural resources (i.e., the stock of clean air in the upper atmosphere). The 
paper highlights the important role played by two key facets of consumer preferences, 
namely the temporal substitution among final goods of diverse environmental impacts 
(represented by their elasticity of substitution) and the inter-temporal substitution of 
consumption (represented by the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, EMU ). 
If the EMU is greater than one, an optimal pollution tax ensures sustainable growth 
even if the elasticity of substitution in production between clean and dirty inputs and 
in consumption between clean and dirty consumer goods are well below one without 
requiring any further government intervention. If the EMU is less than one, 
sustainable growth is still feasible but requires much more demanding conditions: 
either temporal elasticity of substitution must be substantially greater than one. 
This paper finds further that even a suboptimal pollution tax may allow sustainable 
development as long as the tax time profile meets certain plausible conditions that are 




if the pollution tax used as the sole policy instrument to prevent climatic disaster is 
well designed, it may only modestly affect the rate of economic growth. 
The paper assumes that there exists a threshold level of the stock of the renewable 
natural resource which, if crossed, may drastically and irreversibly harm human 
health with the utility of the representative consumer falling to minus infinity 
(Cropper, 1976; Keller et al., 2004; Nævdal, 2006; Nævdal and Oppenheimer, 2007; 
Leizarowitz and Tsur, 2012). However, as long as such stock is above this threshold, 
human welfare is only affected by the flow levels of pollution emissions gradually.32 
The paper explores the properties of a pollution tax for sustainable development 
under the resource stock constraint and identifies a family of growth paths (including 
suboptimal paths as well as an optimal one) each of which guaranteeing 
environmentally sustainable economic growth.  
The theoretical literature on growth and the environment over the last few decades 
has provided significant insights regarding the role of institutional and policy 
conditions in supporting environmentally sustainable economic growth (i.e., 
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1997; Stokey, 1998; Brock 
and Taylor, 2010; Golosov et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012).  Despite substantial 
progress in modeling, the existing growth theoretic literature still relies on certain 
restrictive models and assumptions that often fail to persuade many (especially 
                                                 
32 Consider the case of climate change gases; the emission flows consist not of one gas but of a cocktail 
of pollutants, including pollutants of mostly local effects (i.e., carbon monoxide), of local and global 
climatic effects (i.e., soot), and mainly global effects (i.e., carbon dioxide). The latter two pollutants 
accumulate in the upper atmosphere, thus affecting the stock of “clean air” over time. The effect of 
these flows is to cause health and other detrimental effects gradually over time while the stock 
accumulation effect is of little immediate effect as long as certain threshold stock levels are not 
surpassed.  If the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere increased marginally from 250 parts per million 
(ppm), there is little consequence for human life. However, if it surpasses, for example, 650 ppm, the 




environmentalists and ecologists) of the idea that persistent positive economic growth 
over the long run may eventually be consistent with an improving environment, thus 
preventing environmental catastrophe. The present paper is mainly inspired by and 
related to the landmark studies by Stokey (1998) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). It 
generalizes their findings in several respects by highlighting the role of a variety of 
features of consumer preferences and producer technologies, demonstrating that, 
contrary to the conclusion of most studies, elastic production and/or consumer 
choices are not necessary conditions for sustainable economic growth. 
Most existing growth models assume one final good, which precludes the existence 
of an output composition effect, often considered important by empirical analyses 
(i.e., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Cole and Elliot, 2003). A model with two final 
goods and two factors of production, as the one we developed below, may be 
considered isomorphic to existing models which assume one final good produced 
using two inputs one of which is a composite input in turn produced with another 
clean input and a dirty one (as in Acemoglu et al., 2012). However, this is not 
necessarily the case; a model that explicitly recognizes more than one final good 
where both endogenous savings and technological change are sources of economic 
growth, as the one developed below, brings to the forefront peculiarities of consumer 
conditions, in particular the role of the EMU vis-à-vis the temporal elasticity of 
substitution either among consumption goods or factors of production. We show that 
the relationship between EMU and the temporal elasticity of substitution in 




lost in models that assume a single final good with technological change as the 
primary source of economic growth.33 
Standard growth models that allow for savings as a source of growth often assume 
that the value of EMU is greater than one, an assumption that has been criticized by 
prominent authors on conceptual grounds (i.e., Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Ogaki and 
Reinhart 1998). Additionally, the empirical evidence regarding the size of EMU  is 
mixed; some recent studies tend to contradict this assumption (i.e., Ogaki and 
Reinhart 1998; Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003; Layard et al., 2008). We thus 
relax this assumption and consider sustainable development alternatively considering 
levels of EMU above or below one.  
Most existing models assume either unitary or highly elastic substitution between 
man-made and environmental factors of production (i.e., Stokey, 1998; Acemoglu et 
al., 2012).34This assumption has been challenged by environmentalists claiming that 
natural capital (i.e., the environment) and man-made capital are complements rather 
than substitutes (Daly, 1992). Moreover, to some degree, a number of empirical 
studies seem to support the claims made by environmentalists, concluding that factor 
input substitution is indeed substantially less than one (i.e., Field and Grebenstein, 
1980; Kemfert and Welsch, 2000; van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012).  
Empirical studies report stronger substitution between clean and dirty consumer 
goods than among factors of production, often obtaining elasticity of substitution 
                                                 
33 See Baylis, Fullerton and Karney (2013) for the importance of considering at least two final goods 
and two productive inputs in examining the effects of unilateral carbon policy in a static equilibrium 
model. 
34 Recent growth theoretic studies do allow for factor input complementarities but in the context of 
non-renewable resources; their depletion is assumed to induce endogenous innovation (Bretschger and 
Smulders, 2012; Peretto, 2009). The focus on non-renewable resources, however, prevent 
consideration of the possibility of catastrophic and irreversible losses of renewable natural resources 




estimates well above 3 for consumer goods. Consequently, it appears that the scope 
for substitution between clean and dirty goods by consumers is greater than the 
substitution potential among inputs by producers, a feature that we explicitly consider 
in this study (i.e., Lin et al., 2008; Galarraga et al., 2011).35  
Clean input-augmenting exogenous technological change is often assumed (i.e., 
Stokey, 1998; Brock and Taylor, 2010). However, recent studies have emphasized the 
endogenous nature of technological change; for example, Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
allows for endogenous technological change, showing that targeted research subsidies 
may transform pollution-augmenting technological change into clean input-
augmenting technological change as long as the elasticity of substitution between the 
clean and dirty inputs is much greater than one. Otherwise, targeted research 
subsidies are impotent to affect the structure of technological change. We consider 
exogenous technological change allowing alternatively for various types of it (neutral, 
pollution-augmenting and/or clean input-augmenting), an assumption that simplifies 
the analysis considerably. In view of the point made by Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
regarding the impotency of research subsidies when the elasticity of substitution 
between clean and dirty inputs is less than one, the assumption of exogenous 
technological change is innocuous, given that we focus mostly on cases where this 
elasticity is in fact less than one. Moreover, as Golosov et al. (2011) show, whether 
technological change is endogenous or exogenous is irrelevant in deriving an optimal 
disaster-avoiding pollution tax.  
                                                 
35 Moreover, studies have shown that the consumers' flexibility with regards to clean goods is highly 
responsive to increased information and public education on the pollution content of the various 
consumer goods, as well as to eco-labeling (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). This is in sharp contrast with 





The standard neoclassical growth model of sustainable development has been 
criticized by environmentalists mainly on the grounds that man-made and natural 
capital are not likely to be strong substitutes in production, as assumed by most 
neoclassical growth models (i.e., Daly, 1992) and that there is excessive optimism 
regarding the role of technological change (i.e., Vollebergh and Kemfert, 2005).      
The fact that we show that environmental sustainability accompanied with positive 
and persistent economic growth can be achieved in economies where natural and 
man-made capital have low elasticity of substitution, and that it may proceed under 
any type of technological change, constitutes an important response to the above 
critiques. 
2. Framework of the Analysis 
The economy produces two goods: a clean good and a dirty one. The dirty good 
sector includes traditional manufacturing industries and primary industries that 
generate air and/or water pollution as a byproduct of their production processes. The 
clean good sector includes services and other goods that generate little or no pollution.  
Production.—Let k  denote the total man-made composite input available at time t   
in the economy. This composite input includes human capital as well as other more 
tangible forms of capital. Henceforth, we refer to k  as “capital”, which is 
momentarily distributed between the clean industry and the dirty industry. Let dk  
denote the amount of capital employed in the dirty industry. The flow of pollution 
from the dirty sector is represented by x. Following Cropper and Oates (1992), López 
(1994), and Copeland and Taylor (2004), we consider pollution as a factor of 




(1)                                              ( , ).d d dy A F k bx=  
The parameter dA  denotes total factor productivity with proportional growth rate,
/ 0d d dA A gº ³&  and 1b >   is a factor-augmenting technological factor with 
/ 0b b zº ³& . 
The dirty sector produces only a final consumer good. F  is a Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution (CES) function, and it is given as follows:  
1 1 1
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where w  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and pollution and a  is a 
fixed distribution coefficient.  
The output of the clean good is assumed to depend only on the capital input and is 
governed by the linear production technology, as follows: 
(2)                                                   ( ).c c dy A k k= -  
where the parameter CA  is the return to capital in the clean sector and k  is the total 
stock of capital in the economy at a point in time. The clean sector produces a final 
consumer good as well as new capital (or investment). Mostly for the sake of 
reducing notational clutter, we focus primarily on pollution-augmenting and neutral 
technological change. Later in the paper, however, we show that the results remain 
mostly unchanged by considering capital-augmenting technological change. 
We consider two sources of economic growth, technological change and capital 
accumulation. We specify the various types of technological change below. Here we 




normalize the price of the clean good to unity (i.e., 1cp = ), the economy’s budget 
constraint can be written as: 
(3)                                   ( ) ( , ) ,c d d dk A k k pA F k bx c kd= - + - -&  
where /d cp p pº  is the relative price of dirty goods, c dc c pcº +  is the total 
consumption expenditure expressed in units of the clean good, d is the rate of capital 
depreciation, and /k dk dtº&  is the net capital accumulation. The sum of the first two 
terms on the right-hand side of Equation (3) represents the income of the economy 
expressed in units of clean goods. The gross capital accumulation, k kd+& , is equal to 
net savings (income less consumption), which is also expressed in units of the clean 
good.36 
Stock of clean air.—Economic activity releases pollution flows into the atmosphere. 
A portion of the pollution emissions are removed by nature’s revitalization processes 
but another portion of them remains as a stock that accumulates in the upper 
atmosphere. Pollution emissions (whether they accumulate in the atmosphere or 
rapidly dissipate) have instantaneous direct negative effects on welfare. In addition, 
the fact that a portion of the emissions accumulates in the upper atmosphere causes 
very gradual and subtle changes in climate, which may have negligible direct effects 
on welfare unless such accumulations reach a threshold level at which point 
catastrophic events may be triggered, causing massive welfare losses. 
Thus, pollution reduces the stock of clean air, so that the changes in the stock of 
clean air are the net result of two forces, the natural purification rate of pollution and 
                                                 
36 We assume that the investment in capital is irreversible. Once the economy builds capital, it cannot 





the flow emission of pollution. Following most of the literature we assume a constant 
rate of environmental regeneration (i.e., Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 
2012). Denote the stock of clean air in the upper atmosphere as E , the threshold of 
minimal stock of clean air below which an environmental catastrophe occurs as E , 
the pristine stock level by E , and let 0 1y< <  be the constant rate of natural 
atmospheric purification. Then we have:  
(4)                                      E E xy= -&  for  E E E£ < . 
                                              x= -          for E E< . 
For future reference we note that by integrating (4) within the specified boundaries 
we obtain: 
(4’)                                ( )0 0( ) exp( ) ( ) exp( )tE t t E x dy u yu u= - -ò  
For ( )E t E³ ; 0E is the initial, predetermined level of the stock of clean air.  
Consumption and welfare.—The welfare function of the representative consumer is 
comprised of two parts, a utility derived from the consumption of goods and the 
disutility generated by pollution. We represent the utility derived from the 
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where   denotes the total consumption expenditure, (1, )e p is the unit (dual) 
expenditure function or cost-of-living index, and 0a >  is a parameter equal to EMU . 
If 1a < , we adopt a positive utility scale such that 0 u< < ¥ , while we scale the utility 




occurs when 1a = , in which case we obtain the often-used logarithmic specification,
ln[ / (1, )]u c e p= . The indirect utility function is assumed to be increasing and strictly 
concave in the real consumption level, / (1, )c e p . 
We assume that the consumer’s underlying preferences for goods are described by 
a CES utility function, so that the unit expenditure function is: 
1
1
1(1, ) ,c de p p
ssg g --é ù= +ë û  
where s  is the consumption elasticity of substitution between the dirty and clean 
goods, and 0cg >  and 0dg >  are fixed parameters. The indirect utility function 
defined above presumes homothetic preferences. Consumer demand for the clean 
good cc  and dirty good dc  can be retrieved from the indirect utility function using 
Roy’s identity. The optimal level of c  is determined by the inter-temporal 
optimization (as detailed below).  
The second part of the welfare function corresponds to the disutility generated by 
pollution. Let ( ; )x En  denote the environmental damage function, which is assumed 
to be increasing and convex in the level of pollution, x . We assume that the 










 if E E³  , 
                                                          = ¥      if E E< .  
Also, 0h >  denotes the elasticity of marginal damage caused by pollution and is 
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Assuming a fixed pure time discount rate ( r ) and socially optimal intervention, the 
competitive economy is modeled “as if” it maximizes the present discounted value of 
the utility function: 
0
( , ; ) exp( ) ,U c x E t dtr
¥
-ò  
subject to the budget constraint (i.e., Equation (3)), clean air stock level constraint 
E E³  (Equation (4)) and the initial conditions 0k k=  and 0E E= . In other words, the 
competitive behavior of the representative consumer and producer under optimal 
pollution tax and lump-sum reimbursement is described by the choices of the optimal 
levels of c  and x  at each point in time.  
We assume that both goods are always produced, which implies that  ( ) ( )dk t k t<  
for all t . Thus, the current value Hamiltonian function assuming an interior solution is: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]( , , ) ( ) ( , )E C d dH U c x E A k k pAF k bx c k E x E El d m y f= + - + - - + - + -  
where l and m  denote co-state variables each representing the shadow price of man-
made capital and natural capital, respectively while 0f ³ is a time-varying Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the stock constraint.  
Analytical Strategy.—We assume that the economy maximizes EH  subject to the 
market equilibrium conditions for the final goods to be introduced later in the next 
section. This means that in addition to the usual endogenous variables of the optimal 




of necessary conditions for dynamic optimization (Maximum principle and Kuhn-
Tucker conditions) and the said market clearing conditions, we may in principle solve 
for seven endogenous variables ( , , , , , , )dc k x p l m f at each point in time. While the 
analysis of the original problem is extremely complex given the fact that the utility 
function is discontinuous at E E= , the dynamic optimization process can be 
examined in a more tractable way if the shadow price of the stock of pollutant, f , is 
zero (that is, if the stock constraint is not binding).  
We therefore use the following strategy: First, we solve the model of dynamic 
optimization and market equilibrium using as a maintained assumption that 0f = , 
that is, that the stock of clean air remains above E  throughout all time. Next, we 
analyze the conditions under which, given the solution derived from the first step, the 
constraint ( )E t E³  is satisfied for all t given initial stock levels of the natural and 
man-made assets, 0E  and 0K . Thus, the first part of the solution is obtained by 
maximizing EH  (subject to the relevant market clearing conditions) with 0f =  and the 
second part examines whether or not this solution satisfies the stock constraint.  
Under our stated assumptions on preferences and production technology, EH  is 
strictly concave with respect to state and control variables, and the necessary 
conditions become sufficient. In fact there exists a unique solution for the optimal 
control problem.37 In the subsequent sections, we also characterize the conditions for 
the clean air stock to remain above the threshold level. If the optimal path of 
                                                 
37 We note also that the Inada condition is satisfied. In other words, for any 0a > our utility scale 
guarantees that 
0
lim ( , , )xc U c x E® = ¥




emissions obtained by maximizing EH  does not permit the stock of clean air to fall 
below the critical threshold at any point in time then it constitutes an optimal solution 
for the original problem of dynamic market equilibrium with stock constraint.  
Definition of Sustainable Economic Growth.—It is now necessary to define what 
we mean by “sustainable economic growth”.   
Definition 1: We say that sustainable growth is possible if, at some point along the 
growth process, the economy is able to continue growing indefinitely while pollution 
emissions permanently decline and the stock of natural capital never falls below the 
critical threshold level. 
Therefore, sustainability requires that there exists a finite time, 0T ³ , such that at any 




£ , and that ( )E t E³  for all t  .38 
Additional Considerations.—Here we establish some basic properties of the 
consumption and factor shares which are essential for the ensuing analysis. The 
budget share of the dirty final good in the consumption expenditure for the CES 









 and the factor share of the clean input in the cost 
of production of the dirty good for a CES production function is
11
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. Of course, the share of the dirty input in the 
cost of production of the dirty final good is1 kS- . Then we have the following remark: 
                                                 
38 A similar notion has been adopted by several authors, including Stokey (1998) and Brock and Taylor 
(2010). This concept of sustainable growth conforms to the concept of sustainable development in 




Remark 1: The share ( )s p is an increasing (decreasing) function of p  if 1( 1)s s< > . 
The share ( / )k dS k bx  is increasing (decreasing) in /dk bx   if 1( 1)w w> < .  
Remark 1 is important for subsequent analysis because it allows us to predict the 
evolution of ( )s p  and ( / )k dS k bx  over time if we know the dynamics of p  and 
/dk bx , on the basis of the size of the elasticity of substitution. As shown below the 
dynamics of these shares are key factors determining the sustainability (or lack of 
sustainability) of the economy.  
Assumptions.—We make the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: The clean sector of the economy is sufficiently productive so that the 
marginal return to capital ( cA ) is higher than the marginal opportunity cost of 
capital ( r d+ ); hence, 0cM A r dº - - > . 
Assumption 2: Technological change can be pollution-augmenting occurring at an 
exogenous rate 0z ³  and/or neutral, raising the total factor productivity of the dirty 
sector at an exogenous rate 0dg ³ . However, the rate of technological change is 
bounded from above as follows: { , / }dg min M M az + £  . 
Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for the economy to be able to accumulate 
capital over time. Meanwhile, Assumption 2 implies that all exogenous technological 
changes are concentrated in the dirty industry. The assumption of dirty input 
(pollution)-augmenting technological change in the context of endogenous 
technological change is consistent with the so-called laissez-faire or market solution 
arising when the government does not intervene to subsidize research and 




2012). In section Ⅴ , we relax this assumption by also allowing for capital-
augmenting technological change. 
Assumption 2 also places a limit on the speed of technological progress. As we 
shall show below, this limit is necessary for technical reasons. It assures that the net 
effect of the two primary sources of growth, namely capital accumulation and 
technological change, is pollution-increasing while the technique and composition 
effects are pollution-reducing. If this assumption is not satisfied then we would obtain 
that the direct effect of economic growth (i.e., the factor accumulation-cum-
technological change effect) would be pollution-reducing while the technique and 
composition effects would be pollution-increasing. This baffling condition would in 
fact render the analysis of sustainable development meaningless. If the direct effect of 
economic growth were to lower pollution then we would have sustainable 
development even in the absence of a pollution tax and, hence, in the absence of 
technique and composition effects.  
3. Optimality and Market Clearing Conditions  
Optimality Conditions.—The first-order necessary conditions for maximization of 
the Hamiltonian function imply that the marginal utility of consumption must be 
equal to the shadow price of capital,l : 
(5)                                                  1(1, ) .a ae p c l- - =  
Meanwhile, along the optimal path the well-known no arbitrage condition must be 
satisfied: 
(6)                                               [ ] .cA M
l r d
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There are two additional conditions for optimality as follows: first, the marginal 
value product of capital should be equal across the two sectors; second, firms equalize 
the marginal value product of pollution to the optimal pollution tax. Therefore, 
assuming an interior solution, we have: 
(7)                                              
( , ) 0,dd c
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Equation (7) indicates that in equilibrium the marginal value product of capital should 
be equalized across the two sectors. Equation (8) says that the optimal pollution tax, 
which is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between pollution and consumption,
( ) /v xt l¢º  , is equalized to the marginal value product of pollution. Finally, the 
savings should be equal to the net investment at each moment of time, so that we 
have Equation (3) as an additional first order condition. Moreover, we have the 
standard transversality condition, lim ( ) 0t
t
k t e rl -
®¥
= . 
Market clearing conditions.—In Appendix we show that the rate of growth of the 
consumer demand for dirty goods is:  
(9)                                          
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A circumflex above the symbol reflects its corresponding rate of growth. In addition, 
the rate of growth of production of the dirty goods is: 
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Because the dirty goods are used for consumption only, market equilibrium requires 
that d dy c=  at all points in time. Furthermore, once the dirty goods market is cleared, 
the market for the clean goods automatically clears because the current savings are 
equal to the current investment, as stipulated in Equation (3). Therefore, the relative 
price of dirty goods must adjust endogenously over time to allow for such equilibrium 
to persist. Along the equilibrium path, the growth rate of production and demand for 
the dirty good must be equal, so that ˆ ˆd dy c= .  
4. Dynamic Equilibrium  
The Conditions.—Using Equation (9) and Equation (10), we obtain: 
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(also recall that /b bz º &  and /d d dg A Aº & ). The 
function z corresponds to the weighted average of the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution (1/ a ) and the temporal elasticity of substitution, using the budget shares 
as weighting factors.  
From Equation (7), we have 1ˆ ˆˆ ( , ) 0D dp A F k bx+ + = , which given the CES 
production function implies that:  
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, is equal to the rate of increase of the input price, which in 
turn equals rate of increase of the pollution tax, ˆ x̂ Mt h= + .  
Solution of the dynamical system.—In Appendix, we show that the dynamical 







 and x̂  as follows: 
(14) 
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where [ ]1 (1 )(1 ) 0k k kW S z S Sh hwº - + + + > .  
Using Equation (16) we can decompose the dynamics of pollution flows into four 
partial effects, as follows: 
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where / 0k M ae º >  is the pure capital increasing effect; ( ) 0t Dge zº - + < is the 
pure technological change effect; [ ] 0s kS Me w zº - - < is the technique effect; and 
{ }(1 )[ ]c K D k Dz S g S M ge zº - - - - is the output composition effect.  
The pure capital effect and technological change effect constitute the two primary 
sources of economic growth. Meanwhile, the technique and output composition 
effects are dependent on the primary sources of growth. The pure capital scale effect, 
ceteris paribus, increases pollution while the pure technological change effect 
reduces pollution because it reflects the fact that the effective dirty input may rise 
over time without necessarily increasing pollution. Assumption 2 guarantees that the 
net direct effect of economic growth, k te e+ , is pollution-increasing.  
Expanding income due to the two primary sources induces an increase of the 
pollution tax due to the fact that the marginal utility of consumption, l , falls as 
0M > . This means that the relative price of the dirty input (pollution) increases over 
time which, in turn, triggers a technique or input substitution effect that has a 
pollution-reducing effect. The tax increase also causes an output composition effect 
by raising the cost of production and, hence the relative price, of the dirty good which 
in turn induces consumers to substitute consumption of dirty goods with clean goods 
and, hence, reduce pollution.  
Pollution-augmenting technological change weakens both the technique and 
composition effects. Assumption 2 assures that although technological change only 
partially mitigates these effects, it cannot reverse them. The increase of the 
productivity of pollution due to technological change counters the effect of the 




causing the incentives to substitute pollution with clean inputs to weaken. Similarly, 
the increased productivity associated with technological change attenuates the cost 
increase of the dirty goods caused by the pollution tax. This, in turn, reduces the price 
increase of the dirty goods and, hence, weakens the consumers’ incentives to 
substitute dirty goods with clean ones.  
The optimal pollution tax dynamics.—Finally, we derive the dynamics of the optimal 
pollution tax that is consistent with the system (14) to (16). Noting that '( ) /v xt l=  
we have that ˆ x̂ Mt h= + . Therefore, using Equations (8), (13) and (15) we can derive 
the rate of change of the pollution tax over time:  
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By Assumption 2, / dM a gz³ + , which means that the pollution tax increases 
continuously along the optimal path. While the tax increases over time, the share of 
the pollution tax costs on the total value of consumption, /x ct , may eventually 
decline along the optimal path. 
 Suboptimal pollution paths.—The fact that we can obtain an explicit and tractable 
solution for the optimal rates of change of pollution and the other relevant variables 
show that, with enough information regarding the key parameters considered, this 
part of the solution is relatively easy to obtain for a government or planner. But this is, 
of course, not a complete solution; in order to obtain a complete solution we need to 
solve for the initial values of the endogenous variables ( p , /dk bx , x  and, therefore, 
t ) in addition to their optimal rates of change as provided by (14) to (16).  In fact, 




for governments. Fortunately, as can be seen though an inspection of equations (14) 
to (16), the optimal rates of change of the variables are not dependent on the initial 
values of such variables.  
This characteristic of the dynamical solution is very important because, as we shall 
see below, it allows us to determine the maximal critical initial level of pollution that 
assures that the stock of clean air will never fall below the catastrophic threshold. An 
imperfect government that is unable to ascertain the optimal initial values of the 
endogenous variables could still determine such a critical level and its job would be 
reduced to ensuring that the initial pollution level is below the critical point and from 
then on follows the myopic growth rule dictated by equation (16). The result would 
be a suboptimal rule, implying higher pollution levels than the optimum at all points 
in time, but one that assures sustainable and positive economic growth thus 
preventing environmental disaster. Section 6 deals with these issues.  
5. Economic Growth 
An important issue is whether the dynamic path described by Equations (14) to (16) 
implies a positive rate of consumption growth despite that the pollution tax is 
continuously increasing. The following proposition shows that this is indeed the case: 
Proposition 1: (i) The growth rate of real consumption expenditure is:
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where p̂  is given by (14).(ii) The rate of growth of real 
consumption remains positive throughout the equilibrium dynamic path for any 
positive w  and s .(iii) If either input substitution or consumption substitution is 




converges from below towards a rate /M a . If both 1w > and 1s >  , then the growth 
rate of real consumption converges to ( )(1/ ) da M g+ .(iv) If 1w <  and 1s < , then 
the rate of growth of real consumption converges from above towards a rate
( )(1 ) / ( ) ( ) /da g M ah h z+ + + < . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the dynamic equilibrium path described by 
Equations (14) to (16) is associated with a positive rate of growth of real consumption 
regardless of the size of the elasticity of substitution. However, the economy’s growth 
rate is below its potential as a consequence of the fact that the optimal pollution tax 
forces the relative price of dirty goods to continuously increase over time. This, in 
turn, increases the cost of living for consumers, implying that economic growth must 
be partially sacrificed. However, as shown in Remark 1, if 1s > , the share of the 
dirty goods in the consumption bundle declines, and if 1w > , the share of the clean 
input in production increases. In either of these cases the sacrifice of the growth rate 
vis-à-vis its potential level becomes progressively smaller beyond a certain point in 
time. That is, the growth rate of the economy approaches in the long run its maximum 
potential rate, which in this case is equal to /M a  in the absence of neutral 
technological progress in the dirty sector. 
The fact that when 1s >  or 1w >  the convergence (or long run rate of growth) of 
the economy is not affected by the rate of pollution-augmenting technological change 
might seem surprising. The reason for this fact is that, in this case, the consumer 




approaches zero. 39  That is, pollution-augmenting technological change becomes 
irrelevant for economic growth over the long run because the share of the dirty input 
in the production of the dirty goods and/or the share of dirty final goods constitute a 
negligible fraction of the economy.  
Furthermore, from Remark 1 it follows that if 1w < and 1s < , the share of the dirty 
input (pollution) in the cost of production increases over time and the share of dirty 
goods in the consumer budget increases over time, both converging to 1. Therefore, in 
such a case the technological change becomes the key determinant of the convergence 
rate of economic growth. Conversely, because the share of the clean goods 
approaches zero, the capacity of the economy to expand such goods becomes 
increasingly irrelevant for economic growth. This means that in the inelastic case the 
economy’s growth rate declines and becomes increasingly dependent on the rate of 
technological change and less dependent on the rate of capital accumulation as the 
shares of the dirty input and dirty final output increase over time. Moreover, 
Assumption 2 implies that the growth rate of the economy converges to a lower level 
than in the elastic case.  
The following corollary to Proposition 1 summarizes the results discussed in the 
previous two paragraphs: 
Corollary 1: Economies characterized by elastic producer and/or consumer choices 
tend to grow more rapidly and converge towards higher secular growth rates than 
economies exhibiting inelastic producer and consumer choices. 
                                                 
39  This is true if 1s >   but 1w <  because in this case the consumption share of the dirty goods 
approaches zero and hence the participation of the dirty goods in the economy becomes negligible in 
the very long run. Furthermore, if 1s <  but 1w >  the share of pollution in production of the dirty 
goods approaches zero, meaning that in the very long run the participation of pollution as an input 




 6. Conditions for Sustainable Growth (assuming that 0f = ) 
We first consider the case when EMU is greater than one, as assumed by standard 
sustainable growth models. In this study we will also consider the case when EMU  is 
less than one, in light of the fact that some recent studies have shown that the EMU  
may reach levels below one, contrary to what has previously been assumed to be the 
case (i.e., Attanasio and Browning, 1995; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Although the 
analysis is conducted under the assumption of pollution-augmenting and neutral 
technological progress in the dirty sector, the results hold under the more general 
assumptions on technological changes, including capital-augmenting technological 
progress in the dirty sector. This is shown in Appendix.  
A. The Case When EMU  is Greater Than One  
A consequence of allowing 1a >  is that the rate of economic growth is slower than 
in a case where 1a < . In other words, the scale effect is less powerful and, hence, 
ceteris paribus, pollution emissions will tend to grow more slowly as the economy 
grows. This makes the conditions for sustainability much weaker than in a case where 
1a < . From Proposition 1 and Equation (16), the following proposition emerges: 
Proposition 2: Suppose 1a > , technological change is either pollution-augmenting 
and/or neutral or non-existent, and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, if either s  
and/or w  is positive, an optimal pollution tax is sufficient to induce sustainable 
development.   
Proof: See Appendix. 
Therefore, the conditions for sustainable development are extraordinarily weak in the 




of pollution increases rapidly with income. The growth effect then becomes relatively 
weak vis-à-vis the case where 1a < . Even when both consumption and input elasticity 
of substitution are less than one, sustainable development arises.  
The intuition of this important result is as follows: assuming that 1s < and 1w < , 







in Proposition 1, the secular or long run rate of growth of real consumption is found 
to be equal to the growth rate of dirty consumer goods. The rationale for this result is 
that in the long run, the clean consumption goods become a negligible fraction of 
total consumption and, hence, the rate of growth of total consumption is given by the 
rate of growth of the dirty consumption goods only. This, in turn, implies that the rate 
of long run growth of the dirty output is also equal to the long run growth rate of real 
consumption. Therefore, using part (iii) of Proposition 1, it follows that: 
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where the ¥ superscript denotes the long run values (i.e., ˆ ˆlimd dty y
¥
®¥
º ).40  We note 
from the above expression that since 1a > , the long run rate of growth of the dirty 
good is less than the growth rate of technological change. On the other hand, from 
Equation (9) it follows that since over the long run 0kS ®  (because 1w < ) then
ˆ ˆd dy g xz
¥ ¥= + + . Hence, ˆ 0x¥ < . If 1a > , then the economy’s growth rate is low 
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since the market equilibrium condition implies that ˆ ˆ ˆd d dc y g xz¥ ¥ ¥= = + + , we have; 
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enough to have a smaller impact on pollution. This, in turn, means that an optimal 
pollution tax is sufficient to cause pollution to decrease over the long run, even if the 
economy is wholly inelastic. 
Of course, while sustainability is in this case attained, the rate of economic growth 
of the economy remains positive; however, if both 1s <  and 1w < , this rate can be 
quite low and may be below the rate of technological change. In other words, the 
sacrifice in terms of economic growth imposed by environmental sustainability is, in 
this case, large and permanent. However, this is not the case when either producers or 
consumers exhibit higher rates of flexibility. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, 
if 1s >  and/or 1w > , then sustainable growth also arises. Moreover, in such cases 
part (ii) or (iii) of Proposition 1 apply, meaning that the long run rate of growth of 
real consumption is /M a , which is of course greater than the long run rate of growth 
prevailing when both  1s <  and 1w <  (






). In other words, in 
such a case, the growth rate sacrifice in terms of environmental sustainability is much 
smaller and is merely temporary.  
The reason why this important result is missed by the standard growth theoretical 
models is that they drastically limit the consumer’s role in the economy by assuming 
only one final good. Proposition 2 arises because the growth rate of the consumption 
of the dirty goods dictates the long run rate of growth of real consumption, which is 
sufficiently slow to permit pollution to eventually start falling within a finite period of 
time. Therefore, we are able to derive this considerably important new insight by 




consumption is greater than one, then the sustainable economic growth is effectively 
a natural condition, provided an optimal environmental tax is implemented.  
B. Capital-Augmenting Technological Progress 
We now introduce capital-augmenting technological progress in the dirty sector to 
demonstrate the robustness of our results in Proposition 2. In the case of capital-
augmenting technological change affecting the dirty sector, we simply augment 
capital by factor, n , with / 0n n q= >& .  
Corollary 2: Suppose 1a > , technological change in the dirty sector augments any 
factor of production (and/or is neutral or non-existent), and that Assumptions 1 and 2 
hold. Then, if either s  and/or w  is positive, an optimal pollution tax is sufficient to 
induce sustainable development.   
Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary 2 implies that progressively higher optimal pollution tax along the growth 
path induces sustainable growth under any type of exogenous technological changes. 
Corollary 2 also implies that when 1w <  and 1s < , the necessary and sufficient 
condition for sustainable growth is that EMU  is greater than one.  
When the technical elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs is 
greater than one, capital-augmenting technological change decreases the relative price 
of dirty goods even under the rising pollution tax. Since the expenditure share of dirty 
goods increases when the consumption elasticity of substitution is greater than one, 
the flexibility requirement in the production of dirty goods under capital-augmenting 
technological change becomes more stringent than in its absence. On the other hand, 




technological progress makes it easier to achieve sustainable growth than its absence 
would.  
Finally, it can be shown that if the capital-augmenting technological progress takes 
place not only in the dirty sector but also in the clean sector, together with pollution-
augmenting technological progress, sustainable growth occurs under an optimal 
pollution tax. Thus, as long as EMU  is greater than one, sustainable growth occurs 
under an optimal pollution tax for any type of exogenous technological progress.  
C. The Case When EMU  is Less Than One 
Here, we demonstrate that when 1a <  the conditions for sustainable economic 
growth are more demanding than in the previous case. This section will first 
characterize the output composition effect and will then look into the input 
substitution (or technique) effect.  
The output composition effect.—The composition effect works when consumers 
substitute dirty goods with clean goods in the face of the rising relative price of the 
dirty goods. Here we consider the case when the consumption elasticity of 
substitution is strictly greater than 1, but the production elasticity of substitution is 
less than 1. In this case, the feasibility of sustainable growth relies exclusively on 
consumer flexibility. Using Remark 1, it follows that the factor share of the clean 
input in the output value of the dirty final goods, kS , converges to zero (and 
concomitantly, the share of the dirty input converges to 1). The fact that the relative 
price of dirty goods continuously increases over time means that consumers substitute 
dirty goods with clean ones.  
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The threshold level, ( , ; , )dd M a gz , above which sustainable growth becomes 
possible, is increasing in z and dg  respectively. As a consequence of technological 
change in the dirty sector, sustainable growth becomes more difficult. The threshold 
level reduces to 1/ a  in the absence of any form of technological progress. The 
following lemma summarizes the previous results: 
Lemma 1 (on the role of the composition effect): Suppose that technological 
progress is pollution- augmenting and/or neutral or non-existent, and that 
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.  If 1a < , then 1w <  does not preclude sustainable 
economic growth if and only if s  is greater than a threshold level exceeding one (i.e.,
( , ; , ) 1dd M a gs z> > ).  
Lemma 1 underlines the importance of the composition effect in circumventing the 
case of an inelastic production technology. All of the previous analyses have assumed 
a single final good, and hence have ignored the output composition effect, concluding 
that a flexible production technology ( 1w ³ ) is a necessary condition to allow for 
sustainable development. Lemma 1 shows that this is not true as long as consumer 
preferences are sufficiently flexible ( ( , ; , ) 1dd M a gs z> > ). Remarkably, sustainable 




dirty goods is Leontief ( 0w = ); that is, even if clean and dirty inputs are 
complements rather than substitutes. Also, the absence of technological change means 
that ( , ; , ) 1/dd M a g az = and thus the condition for sustainable development is not 
qualitatively affected. 
A sufficient condition for the share of dirty consumption goods to approach zero in 
the long run is that 1s >  when 1w < , so that the relative price of dirty goods increases 
over time. It might seem surprising that this condition is not sufficient for sustainable 
development. This is the case because the share of dirty goods approaching zero does 
not necessarily imply that the rate of growth of the demand for (and hence supply of) 
the final dirty goods will become negative. In fact, the growth rate of dirty goods 
continues to be positive over the long run if the economy’s growth rate is sufficiently 
rapid, and may even surpass the rate of pollution-augmenting technological change, 
in which case pollution will continue to increase in the long run. Lemma 1 shows that 
only when the elasticity is sufficiently large ( ( , ; , ) 1dd M a gs z> > ) will the 
consumption of dirty goods (and hence the production of dirty goods) grow at a rate 
that is below the pollution-augmenting technological change, thus leading to a 
reduction of pollution levels.41 
The input substitution or technique effect.—We will now consider the case when the 
technical elasticity of substitution between the two inputs is strictly greater than one, 
while the consumption elasticity of substitution is less than one but still positive. In 
this case, the cost share of the clean input approaches one, while the share of the dirty 
                                                 
41  Given that 1w < , which implies that lim 0kt S®¥ =
,  it follows from (10) that the rate of growth of the 
dirty good production over the long run is equal to the growth rate of effective pollution, ˆ ˆ
d
y x z¥ = + . 




good in the consumer budget also approaches one. The feasibility of sustainable 
growth depends solely on technique effect. From Equation (16) we have: 
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The first term of the numerator of Equation (18) represents the technique effect 
resulting from a change in the relative factor costs of production. The optimal 
pollution tax causes the pollution input to become increasingly expensive. In addition, 
if the elasticity of substitution between the clean and the dirty input is greater than 
one, the pollution input is gradually substituted with capital, causing its share to 
converge to zero. The second term of the numerator (which is positive) captures the 
productivity effect of pollution, an effect that makes it more difficult to achieve 
sustainable growth over the long-term. The third term represents the effect of growth 
of total factor productivity in the dirty sector, which reduces pollution growth when 
1s < . It follows that sustainable growth only becomes possible if the technique or 
substitution effect outweighs the technological change effect. This condition is 
satisfied if ( , ; ,0) 1d M aw z> >  where 











Consequently, if 1a < , a Cobb-Douglas production function ( 1w = ) is not consistent 
with sustainable development when 0dg = . As we demonstrate below, the standard 
growth models have almost always assumed Cobb-Douglas production functions, and 
are therefore able to conclude that growth is sustainable only because they assume 




Lemma 2 (on the technique or input composition effect): Suppose that 
technological progress is pollution-augmenting and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If 
1a < , then 1s <  does not preclude sustainable economic growth if an optimal 
pollution tax is implemented and w  is greater than a threshold level, ( , ; ,0)d M a z
that exceeds one. 
In our model (unlike, for example, the model in Acemoglu et al., 2012) capital (i.e., 
the clean input) is expanding in a growing economy and, moreover, the rate of 
economic growth is endogenous. Hence, even if technological change is only 
pollution-augmenting and concentrated in the dirty sector (as we assume), the capital-
to-effective pollution ratio ( /dk bx ) may increase without requiring so rapid an 
increase of the pollution tax as to smother economic growth. This follows because the 
technique effect does not rely exclusively on the pollution tax, but is reinforced by the 
capital growth effect. Therefore, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
pollution is greater than the threshold level, then the substitution effect may dominate 
the expansion effect within the dirty sector and pollution will begin decreasing at 
some finite time along the growth path. Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Suppose that technological change is pollution-augmenting and 
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If 1a < , then sustainable growth is feasible if an optimal 
pollution tax is implemented and either w or s  is greater than the threshold level, 
( , ; ,0)d M a z , which exceeds one.  




Proposition 3 demonstrates that even if technological progress benefits only the 
dirty sector and is biased toward the dirty input in a pollution-augmenting fashion, 
and if the EMU is less than one, then an optimal pollution tax may be sufficient to 
induce environmental sustainability if either the consumer’s preferences or the 
producer’s technologies exhibit sufficient flexibility. From Proposition 1, it follows 
that this occurs while the economy’s growth rate is positive throughout the full 
adjustment path. Moreover, since environmental sustainability requires that either 
1s >  or 1w > , Proposition 1 clearly shows that economic growth is lowered in the 
short run but that the economy’s growth rate gradually recovers towards its potential 
rate over the long run. Therefore, the optimal pollution tax alone can lead to 
sustainable growth without requiring further policy interventions (such as subsidies 
directed at transforming technological change from pollution-augmenting to clean 
sector or clean input augmenting). 
7. Stock Effects: Conditions for Avoiding an Environmental Disaster 
In this section we analyze the conditions under which the solution for the 
dynamical system developed in the previous sections is indeed consistent with 
avoidance of environmental disaster at any point in time.  Assuming that the dynamic 
path of pollution is defined by equation (16), we find that for any given initial level of 
clean air stock there exists a corresponding critical level of initial emission flow such 
that if the initial value of pollution emissions is less than such critical level, the clean 
air stock remains at all times above a minimal threshold level that prevents 
environmental disaster. Otherwise, if the initial pollution level is above the critical 




environmental disaster will eventually ensue. The intuition behind this result is that 
since equation (16) gives the (optimal) rate of change of pollution for all times, then 
the full path of pollution is entirely determined by the initial level of pollution. The 
question is whether along this path the stock of clean air ever reaches the catastrophic 
level. If we find the initial (critical) level of pollution that in conjunction with (16) 
causes a pollution path that exactly avoids reaching such a catastrophic stock level, 
then any other pollution path following the same rate of change established by (16) 
but starting from a lower pollution level will also avoid catastrophe.       
In order to identify such a critical level of initial emissions, we first note that for 
any given initial level of man-made capital, the system of equations (14) to  (16) 
yields a unique optimal growth path for p , ( )/dk x and x .42 In particular, we can 
define the pollution level at a point in time as: 
0
0
( ) exp( ( ) ) ,
t
x t x g du u u= ò  
where ( )g u is the rate of change of pollution at time u ,	which is a function of all 
parameters and the predetermined variable, 0k . As we show below, the effect of the 
initial clean air stock on ( )x t  occurs entirely through its effect on 0x . In addition, the 
stock of clean air at any point in time is given by Equation (4’).  Hence, we can define 
the unique path of pollution emission flows and stock of clean air as conditional 
                                                 
42   We note that the system of equations (14), (15) and (16) can be represented as a system of 
autonomous differential equations ( , ( ), )kp S s p p= Q& , ( ) ( )/ ( , ( ), / )d k dk bx S s p k bx
×
= G  and
( )( , ( ), / , )k dx S s p k bx x= F& . Since ( )Q × , ( )G × and ( )F × are all continuously differentiable functions, 
there exists a unique solution for each set of initial values. We also note that the solution for emission, 
x , constitutes an optimal control for dynamic optimization in the absence of stock constraints. The 
initial level of emission is determined endogenously within the system. Likewise, initial values of dk  




functions of the (endogenous) initial value of pollution as well as of the 
(predetermined) initial stocks of clean air and natural capital as follows: 
0 0( ) ( , ; , )x t G t x k c=  and 0 0 0( ) ( , ; , , )E t J t x k E c= , 
where the function 0 0 0( , ; , , )J t x k E c is defined in (4’) and ( , , )ac s w= denotes a 
vector of structural parameters. Also, we have that 0 0 0(0) (0, ; , )x G x k xc= =  and 
0 0 0 0(0) (0, ; , , )E J x k E Ec= =  by the fixed point theorem. From Equation (4’) it is 
clear that unless the pollution emissions ( )x t  eventually starts falling over time the 
stock constraint, ( )E t E³ for all 0t ³ , cannot be satisfied. 
Let *c  denote the set of ( , , )ac s w=  which guarantees eventual decline of 
pollution emissions, and are the parameters that satisfy the conditions established by 
either Propositions 2 or 3. Then for any c   in *c , and man-made stock of capital, 
we can define the admissible set, 0( , )D kc of initial values of clean air stock and  flow 
level of pollution which assures sustainable growth. Thus, 
                        ( ){ }0 0 0 0 0 0( , ) , ( , ; , , ) ,  for all 0 .D k x E J t x k E E tc c= ³ >  
Given the initial level of clean air, 0E , the set 0 0( , ; )D k Ec of initial levels of flow 
pollution that an economy can emit while maintaining the stock of clean air above the 
threshold level is bounded above and closed. This is so because the function 
0 0 0( , ; , , )J t x k E c is continuous as shown by (4’) and is also bounded from above. 
There exists the maximal element, 0 0( )
cx E  of the set 0 0( , ; )D k Ec , above which an 
environmental disaster occurs. We define { }0 0 0 0 0( , ) , ( )cC k E x E E Ec = £ , which 




Alternatively, we note that for any eventually declining pollution path, there exists 
a time 0T ³  after which pollution decreases in a monotonic way. It follows that there 
exists a critical turnaround time *t T>  such that  
(19)                                    0 0( *) ( *, ; , ) ,
cx t G t x k Ec y= =  
(20)                                   0 0 0( *) ( *, ; , , ) ,
cE t J t x k E Ec= =  
where  0
cx  is the maximum initial level of pollution emissions that corresponds to any 
given 0E E>    consistent with avoiding environmental disaster and *t is the critical 
turnaround time at which the stock of clean air reaches the minimum level necessary 
to avoid a catastrophe. The two equations (19) and (20) solve for the two endogenous 
variable, 0 0 0 0( ; , , , )
c cx x E k E c y=  and 0 0* ( ; , , , )t N E k E c y= . 
43 
Figure 1 illustrates the previous analysis. The thick curve, denoted as C , is the 
envelope of set D  as defined above. Therefore, C  provides an envelope for all 
trajectories of x  as a function of 0E  that satisfy the constraint ( )E t E³  at all times, 
which is called set D  in Figure 1. By contrast, any trajectory that is outside (above) 
the envelope C , denoted as a complement of set D  (set cD ) in Figure 1 (which is 
shaded), reaches an environmental catastrophe.  Figure 1 shows the particular case 
where pollution emissions follow an inverted U-shaped pattern where the envelope 
C  reaches E  at the turnaround time *t . The uniqueness property of the adjustment 
paths guarantees that any two different trajectories starting from different initial 
positions move in parallel and never cross each other. Hence, any trajectory starting 
                                                 




below  0 0( )
cx E  never reaches the catastrophic stock level, while any trajectory 
starting above C  is bound to eventually violate the stock constraint. 
In Figure 1 the curve labeled OO  represents the optimal trajectory while the curve 
SS  shows an arbitrary suboptimal but sustainable trajectory associated with a 
suboptimal tax. The tax that underlying trajectory SS  satisfies two conditions: first, it 
is sufficiently high to permit the initial pollution level to be below the critical level 
( 0
cx ) as defined earlier and second, it adjusts over time to allow for an optimal rate of 
change of pollution according to Equation (16). In general, finding 0
cx  is easier and 
demands much less information than determining the optimal initial pollution level. It 
must be noted that, as expected, pollution levels within trajectory OO  are lower than 
those within trajectory SS  at each point in time.44 
8. Numerical calibrations 
Here we develop a numerical example to obtain further insights into the 
propositions of this paper. 45  In order to highlight the role of the consumption 
composition effect, we assume that the clean and dirty inputs are complements (i.e.,
0w = ). For simplicity we focus only on pollution-augmenting technological progress. 
We first calibrate our model only with flow emissions of pollution using parameters 
based on data from the US economy and check the sustainability condition for the 
stock constraint later.  
                                                 
44 Figure 1 does not illustrate time profiles of pollution emissions for the two trajectories. It can be 
shown, however, that each level of E  is reached at an earlier time along the trajectory OO  than SS . 
Although it appears in the figure that the level of pollution emissions is higher in OO  than SS  
beyond the turnaround level, this is due to the fact that the visual comparison considers indeed 
different points in time. At each point of time the level of E  is higher within trajectory OO  than 
SS . 
45 Here we provide a succinct description of the simulation methodology. For further detail, please 




Parameter Choices.—In the recent literature the long-run annual growth rate of the 
US economy is often assumed to be 2 percent (i.e., Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 2007; 
Acemoglu et al., 2012). As shown in Proposition 1 above, this corresponds to /M a  
where a EMU= . Since the EMU  is assumed to be approximately 2 in the literature, 
the net return to the capital input, M , is approximately 0.04. We thus assume that the 
net return to capital is four percent, and examine the feasibility of sustainable growth 
under varying assumptions of the EMU  and temporal substitution parameters in 
consumption, s .   
Based on recent econometric estimates we alternatively consider values of EMU  
of 2 and 0.8. (i.e., Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998 and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). For 
0.04M = , the long run growth rate of the economy becomes 5 percent when 
0.8EMU = , which is much greater than the commonly accepted rate of 2 percent. In 
spite of this, we perform this simulation to highlight the fact that when EMU  is low, 
the scale effect is much larger and therefore makes sustainable growth more difficult 
to achieve. In addition, in order to highlight the role of the composition effect, we 
consider three different values for s , namely, 4, 2 and 0.8. Finally, we assume that 
the rate of pollution-augmenting technological progress is 0.005z = , the parameter 
for the elasticity of marginal damage is 1h = , the ratio /C DA A  is 1 and the ratio 
/c dg g  in the unit expenditure function is 0.7. 
The pollution emissions path.—Figure 2 provides the growth of pollution 
emissions over time for various values of EMU.46  
                                                 
46  For illustration purposes, we use a time scale obtained by calibrating the changes in the share of the 
clean input (labor) of the U.S. manufacturing industry over the past decade. For the detailed procedure, 




Panel (a) shows the case when 0.8EMU = . If the elasticity of substitution is greater 






, implied by Proposition 3, there exists a 
critical time until which pollution increases monotonically and after which declines 
over time. This turning point depends on the level of s . If 4s =  , the turning point 
takes place in the year 2069, and if 2s = , in 2185. This is due to the fact that the 
consumption composition effect becomes more effective when s  is larger.  Panel (b) 
depicts the case when 2EMU = : if 4s =  then pollution begins falling very quickly 
by the year 2025, but if 2s =  or 0.8s =  then the turning point occurs during a 
much later year (2057 and 2178, respectively). Panel (c) illustrates the pollution 
emissions path for the case when both EMU  and s  are less than one, in which case 
pollution increases in all periods. Given that 1.28s < , pollution emissions continue 
to increase over time for all periods as indicated by Lemma 1. In summary, if 
1EMU <  , sustainable growth requires that the consumption elasticity of substitution 
is greater than the threshold level. However, as shown in Panel (b), if 1EMU >  then 
economic growth is sustainable even if s  is very low (and 0w =  as we assumed 
here). In this case, as predicted by Proposition 2, even highly inelastic consumer 
preferences and producer technology do not prevent pollution from beginning to 
decline along the optimal path. 
Growth sacrifice caused by the pollution tax.—Finally, Panel (a) in Figure 3 
shows the rates of growth of real consumption ( )
^
/c e  for 0.8EMU = . The rate of 
economic growth is always positive, although it falls below the potential growth rate 




rate over the long run. The growth sacrifices over the short and medium terms are 
rather small and growth recovers more quickly if the elasticity of substitution is larger. 
Even when s   is relatively low (i.e., 2), the growth sacrifice is not very large, 
reaching a maximum value of the order of 0.6 annual percentage points, although the 
growth rate begins recovering at a much later date than when 4s = . The growth 
sacrifice is large if s  is less than one (i.e., 0.8s = ) and, more importantly, and as 
predicted by Proposition 1, the economy’s growth rate converges to a lower but still 
positive rate of growth over the long run. 
Panel (b) of Figure 3 illustrates the case when 2EMU = . If 1s < , then the long 
run growth rate remains positive but falls below toward the technological growth rate 
( 0.005z = ). However, as predicted by Proposition 1, if 2s =  then the rate of 
economic growth converges to the potential growth rate /M a  and, moreover, the 
growth sacrifice imposed by environmental sustainability is smaller than the previous 
case and temporary. The maximum reduction of the rate of economic growth is in this 
case only about 0.5 percentage points. In the short run the growth sacrifice caused by 
the pollution tax is only 0.2 percentage points, from 2% annual growth when no 
environmental tax is implemented to about 1.8% when the tax imposed.  
 
Numerical Simulation Considering the Stock Effects.— we now consider the 
possibility of irreversible disaster assuming Cobb-Douglas utility and production 
function, and that 1EMU > . Although there is no clear consensus on the structure of 
the carbon cycle, recent scientific studies find that the lifetime of carbon in the air 




will be removed from the atmosphere within 30 years, implying a 1.6 percent 
regeneration rate of clean air per annum (IPCC, 2007). Then, Equation (19) implies 
that ( *) 0.016x t E= .  
Given the Cobb-Douglas specification, the cost share of clean input in production,
kS , and the consumer’s budget share of the dirty final good, s , are constant. 
Assuming that service output and labor input are less pollution intensive than 
manufacturing output and energy intensive input, we use estimates for the share of 
clean input and clean final goods in world GDP for calibration purposes and set 
0.5kS =  and 0.54s =  (Guscina, 2006; World Bank, 2012). Using the same values 
for the other parameters (i.e., 2a = ; 0.005z = ; 0.04M = ; 1h = ), we obtain from 
Equation (16) that 0( ) exp( )x t x tJ= - , where 0.0085J = , implying that the optimal 
pollution decreasing rate is equal to 0.85 percent per annum. 
Since there is no direct measure to gauge absolutely clean air stock, we construct 
the so-called relative clean air stock (RCAS) index to represent ( )E t  in section 7. Let 
tCarbon  and 
DCarbon   represent the current global carbon stock in year t  and the 
disaster-rendering magnitude of the global carbon stock, both measured in ppm. 
Define RCAS  index as follows; 
( ) ( ) / .D tE t RCAS t Carbon Carbon= =  
For calibration purposes, we assume that the disaster-rendering level of the carbon 
stock is 650 ppm.47 In addition, we set the initial value (year 2013) and pre-industrial 
                                                 
47 Although the disaster-rendering magnitude of the stock of CO2 differs according to various experts, 
commonly accepted carbon concentration levels lie somewhere between 550 ppm and 750 ppm, 
implying a 3 Celsius degree and 4 Celsius degree increase, respectively (i.e., Glasby, 2006; Pearson et 




value of global carbon stock level in the atmosphere at 395 ppm and 280 ppm, 
respectively (NOAA, 2013). Then the clean air stock index for the pre-industrial level 
that we consider environmentally pristine is 650 / 280 2.32E = » ,while the current 
level and disaster-rendering level of clean air stock are 2013 650 / 395 1.81E = »  and
650 / 650 1E = = , respectively.48 
To solve for the corresponding critical level of emission, 2013
cx  numerically, we 
first note that using Equation (19), 
(21)                                        2013 exp( *)
cx t EJ y y- = =  
Also, from Equation (4’) and (20), we have, 
*
2013 20130
( *) exp( *)( exp( ) ) 1
t
E t t E x t dt Ey J= - - = =ò . 
Using the expression for the pollution emissions in the Cobb-Douglas case,
0( ) exp( )x t x tJ= -  and integrating, it follows that the previous expression can be 
written as: 
(22)                      20132013exp( *) (exp( ( ) *) 1) 1
cxt E ty J y
J y
æ ö
+ - + - =ç ÷+è ø
 
Solving Equations (21) and (22) using numerical methods gives the point for the 
year 2013 located in the envelope C , which corresponds to 2013 0.043
cx =  and
2013 1.81E » . We then generate the time profiles of pollution emissions and the stock 
of clean air under alternative scenarios. 
We consider four alternative scenarios.  
                                                 
48 A pre-industrial level of carbon stock is often considered an environmentally clean air condition (i.e., 




Scenario 1 (Optimistic case): The government is able to reduce emissions by 10 
percent below the critical level, 2013
cx , and the rate of pollution emissions growth is to 
be regulated optimally according to Equation (16).  
Scenario 2 (Sufficient case): The government takes measures to reduce emissions 
exactly to the critical level, 2013
cx , and the rate of pollution emissions growth is to be 
regulated optimally according to Equation (16).  
Scenario 3 (Insufficient, late disaster case): The government is unable to reduce 
pollution emissions to the critical level, 2013
cx , and allows emission levels 10 percent 
higher than the critical level, 2013
cx , while still restricting the rate of pollution 
emissions growth optimally according to Equation (16). 
Scenario 4 (Business as usual, early disaster case): Pollution emissions are 10 percent 
above the critical level, 2013
cx , and they grow by 3.1 percent per year, which 
corresponds to the historical growth rate of carbon emissions over the 2000-2010 time 
period (Peters et al., 2011).  
Table 1 shows the simulation results for the time profiles of ( )x t  and ( )E t  under 
the above scenarios. Under Scenario 1, sustainable development takes place. In this 
scenario the turnaround point of the clean air stock occurs in 2066, reaching an 
environmentally pristine condition by 2141. Under Scenario 2, sustainable 
development is also feasible, as the clean air stock never falls below the threshold 
level and starts growing in 2130. Under Scenario 3, an environmental disaster is 
unavoidable; by 2063, the stock of the clean air falls below the threshold level. An 




regulate emissions growth according to the optimal rate of change. Lastly, under 
Scenario 4, an environmental disaster occurs by the year 2028.  
9. Conclusion 
Sustainable development can be achieved under a variety of plausible technological 
conditions using a pollution tax as the only policy instrument.  If the often-used 
assumption regarding EMU  being greater than one holds, then sustainable 
development is almost automatically satisfied as long as either the elasticity of 
substitution in production or in consumption is positive. An optimal pollution tax 
profile rules optimal pollution changes over time as defined by our expression (16) 
and it is sufficiently high to set the initial pollution level below a critical level defined 
in the text.  Even if the initial pollution tax is suboptimal level, sustainable 
development still takes place as long as the initial tax level is sufficient to set the 
initial pollution flow less than or equal to its critical level and that the rate of change 
of the tax over time be at the rate necessary to induce optimal pollution changes over 
time as defined by equation (16).  
Sustainable development mainly becomes an issue when EMU  is less than one. 
Sustainability may also occur in this case if consumer preferences between the clean 
and dirty goods are flexible enough, even if the production technology is highly 
inflexible. In contrast to the assumption of high producer flexibility made by the 
standard growth models, the assumption of consumer flexibility required in this case 
appears to be more adequately supported by empirical studies. This paper has 
demonstrated that neither strong production substitution nor technological optimism 

























Figure 2. Pollution emissions for different values of s  and EMU 
 





Table 1. Time path of pollution emissions and clean air stock under 
different scenarios  
 
 
Scenario 1 Optimistic 
case 
( ˆ 0.0085x = - ) 
Scenario 2 Sufficient 
case 




( ˆ 0.0085x = - ) 
Scenario 4 
Business as usual, 
early disaster case 
( ˆ 0.031x = ) 
Year(t) x(t) E(t) x(t) E(t) x(t) E(t) x(t) E(t) 
2013 0.0387 1.809 0.0430 1.809 0.0473 1.809 0.0473 1.809 
2027 0.0343 1.689 0.0381 1.625 0.0419 1.561 0.0706 1.063 
2028 0.0340 1.682 0.0378 1.613 0.0416 1.544 
Environmental 
Disaster 
2062 0.0255 1.544 0.0283 1.275 0.0311 1.006 




2065 0.0248 1.5425 0.0276 1.252 
2066 0.0246 1.5424 0.0274 1.244 
2067 0.0244 1.5426 0.0271 1.237 
2129 0.0144 2.057 0.0160 1.000 
2130 0.0143 2.076 0.0159 1.00003 




2240 0.0062  2.293 
2241 Pristine condition 
Notes: 1) x(t) and E(t) denote the yearly index of pollution emissions and relative clean air stock, respectively. 2) For 
each scenario, Equation (4’) is used to generate E(t) over time starting from the initial year of 2013.  







Proofs of propositions and assertions in the text 
Derivation of equation (9): 
Use Roy’s identity to derive the demand for the dirty good from the indirect 
utility function as follows. 
(A1)                        2 (1, ).(1, )d
cc e p
e p
=                                                                      
Logarithmic time differentiation yields,   
(A2)                        2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1, ) (1, ).dc c e p e p= + -                                                              
Totally differentiating both sides of first order condition Equation (5) with respect to 
time and using Equation (6), we have,  
(A3)                         
1ˆ ˆ .a Mc e
a a
-æ ö= +ç ÷
è ø
                                                                      
The second term of the right-hand side of Equation (A2) can be written as,  
(A4)                         22
logˆ .d e dpe
dp dt
=                                                                          
Using the CES utility function we obtain, 
(A5)                 ( )2 1




pd e s p
dp p p p
s
s




-æ ö= - = -ç ÷- +è ø
                              
On the other hand, using Shephard’s lemma on the expenditure function (1, )e p  we 
have,  
(A6)                        2ˆ ˆ ˆ(1, ) ( )pee p p s p p
e




Using Equation (A5) into Equation (A4) and then using (A3), (A4) and (A6) in (A2) 
we find,    
(A7)                   [ ]1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) 1) ( )d
ac M s p p s p p s p p
a
s-æ ö= - + - -ç ÷
è ø
 
                    
1 ( ) ˆ(1 ( )) .s pM s p p
a a
sé ù= - + -ê úë û
 
Derivation of Equation (13) : 
Logarithmic total differentiation of both sides of the first order condition Equation (8), 
(A8)                    ( )
^
2
ˆˆˆ ˆ ( , ) .D dx p g b F k bxh l- = + + +                                             
Also, since the function F is  CES , we have, 
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Rearranging (A8) and using (A9) and b̂ zº , we arrive at  
(A10)                  
^
ˆ ˆ .k d D
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è ø
                                                       
 
Derivation of equations (14), (15) and (16) : 
The system of Equations (11), (12) and (13) in matrix form can be written as, 
ˆ1





















Using Cramer’s rule and noting that the determinant  
                  [ ]
1
1 11 (1 ) 0 (1 )(1 ) 0,
11
k
k k k k
k
z S






= - - = - + + + >
-
 
we arrive at the solutions that are given in Equations (14), (15) and (16).  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
( )i  The growth rate of real consumption is 
^
ˆ ˆc c e
e
æ ö = -ç ÷
è ø
. Using Equations (A3) and 
(A6), it follows that 
(A11)                        [ ]
^
1 ˆ( )c M s p p
e a
æ ö = -ç ÷
è ø
. 






















=  and  
ˆ gp =





é ùæ ö- - + + +ç ÷ê úè øë û . Then since ˆ 0bp <  and ˆ 0gp < , we find 








(A12)           [ ]
[ ]0
(1/ ) (1 ) ( / ) 1
ˆ
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- + + +
. 
Rearranging (A12) we have,  
(A13)           [ ](1 ) 1 ( ) (1 )(1 ) .k k k kS s p S z S Sa
h h h wæ ö- + < - + + +ç ÷
è ø
 
Since ( ) 0k kS Sh w+ >  and 
( ) (1 ( ))s pz s p
a
sº + - , (A13) is satisfied if the following 
inequality holds,   
(A14)             ( ) ( )( ) 1 (1 ( ))s p s ps p s p
a a
h h sh+ < + + - , 
or, equivalently if 0 (1 ( ))(1 )s p sh< - + , which is always true for 0 ( ) 1s p< < . Thus, 
we have ˆ ( / ( ))p M s p<  at any finite point of time and for all finite s  and w . That is, 
real consumption growth is positive along the equilibrium dynamic path. 
( )iii  If 1w > , then lim 1kt S®¥ = and ˆlim dt p g®¥ = - for any 0s > . If  1s < , lim ( ) 0t s p®¥ = . 
Suppose that 1w <  and 1s > . Then we have lim 0kt S®¥ = and the relative price of dirty 
goods monotonically increases over time under Assumption 2. It then follows that 




= . In either case we find that ˆ( )s p p  approaches to zero. Thus, from (A11) 
it follows that the growth rate of real consumption converges from below to /M a  if 
either 1w >  or 1s > , but not both. When 1w > , and 1s > , then ˆlim dt p g®¥ = -  and 




= . It follows that ˆ( )s p p  converges to dg-  and the consumption growth 
rate converges to ( ) /dM g a+ . 
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. Thus, using this 
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towards the limit from above. Substituting the definitions of W  and z into Equation 
(14) we can write, 
1 /(1 ) ( ) (1 )
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Clearly, this expression is increasing in s  and decreasing in kS . If 1s <  it follows 
that s is increasing over time as p  increases. Also, since /dk bx  increases over time, 
the assumption that 1w <  implies that kS  is falling. Thus, along the equilibrium 
growth path ˆsp  is increasing when dg  is sufficiently small. Hence, we have that 
[ ]
^
1 ˆ( )c M s p p
e a
æ ö = -ç ÷
è ø
 must be falling over time. That is, the rate of growth of real 






 from above. In other words, if  










 note that this inequality can be written as
/ ( ) ( )d dM M a g gh z h z+ > + + + , which is true under Assumption 2.  QED       
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Proposition 1 already shows that the growth rate of real consumption always remains 
positive for any positive w  and .s  Here we show that positive growth is 




<   as 
long as 1a > .  We first note from Equation (15) that /dk bx  always increases over 
time which implies that lim 1kt S®¥ =  for 1w > , and lim 0kt S®¥ =  for 1w < . Then from 









1w > .  
Case 1:  1w >  and 1s >  








= ; lim 1kt S®¥ = . 
Plugging these values into Equation (16),  






ì üæ ö æ ö= - - - + -í ýç ÷ ç ÷+ è ø è øî þ





<  if 1a > . This is also valid if technological change is absent,z = dg =0. 
Case 2: 1w >  and 1s <  








= ; lim 1kt S®¥ = .  
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Case 3: 1w <  and 1s >  








= ; lim 0kt S®¥ = .  
Plugging these values into Equation (16),   
1ˆlim ( ) .
(1 ) d dt
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Case 4: 1w <  and 1s <   








= ; lim 0kt S®¥ = .  
Plugging these values into Equation (16),  ( )1 1ˆlim 1 0
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. 
Case 5: 1w ¹ and 1s =  
We have 0 1s b< = <  and (1 ) 1z
a
b b= + - <  for  1a > . We consider two cases. 
If 1w > , then  lim 1kt S®¥ =  and ( )
1ˆlim ( 1)
1 dt
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< . If 1w < ,  then lim 0kt S®¥ =  and 
1 1ˆlim (1 ) ( 1)
1 dt
















Case 6: 1w =  and 1s ¹  
Since 0 1kS a< = < , we have ; 
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 . We consider 
four alternative cases. 
(i) 1s < and 
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It follows that 
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magnitude of  0dg > . 
(ii) 1s >  and 
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. The first term of the numerator 
is negative, while the sum of second and third term becomes negative since 
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Case 7: 1w =  and 1s =   
We always have 0 1kS a< = < ,  0 ( ) 1s p b< = <  , and  (1 ) 1z a





<  if and only if ( )1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0M z za a a z a a
æ ö- - - - - - - <ç ÷
è ø
.  
Rearranging, we have, 
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The first term is negative since 
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-
, and the second 
term is also negative since 1z < .QED  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
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Proof of Corollary 2: 
If we allow capital-augmenting technological change, / 0n n q= >& , in addition to 
pollution-augmenting and neutral technological change in the dirty sector, the 







 and x̂  become as follow: 
(A16) 
[ ]
1(1 ) 1 (1 )( 1)
1ˆ ,
1(1 )( 1) ( )
k d k k
k k




h h w h
w
w
z h q h
w
æ öé ù é ùæ ö æ ö- + - - + + +ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ê ú ê úè ø è øë û ë ûç ÷=
ç ÷








1 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 0d d
nk M g z z
bx W a
h h z h q hé ùæ ö æ ö= + + - - + + + >ç ÷ç ÷ ê úè øè ø ë û
 
(A18)
( )1 1ˆ (1 ) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) 1 ,k k d k k kx M z S S g z S z z S SW a w q w z ww
ì üæ ö= - - - + - + - + - + -í ýç ÷
è øî þ
 
where [ ]1 (1 )(1 ) 0k k kW S z S Sh hwº - + + + > .  
We prove Corollary 2 for all different cases of parameter combinations.  
Case 1: 1w > and 1s >  
By Equation (A17) for 1w > , we have lim 1kt S®¥ = . Plugging this into Equation (A16), 
we have; 
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Case 2: 1w > and 1s <  
By Equation (A17) for 1w > , we have lim 1kt S®¥ =  . Plugging this into Equation  (A16), 
we have; 
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Case 3: 1w < and 1s >  
By Equation (A17) for 1w > , we have lim 0kt S®¥ =  .  Plugging this into Equation 
(A16), we have; 
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For  1a > , this requirement is automatically satisfied since 3( , ) 1dh gz < . 
Case 4: 1w <  and 1s <  
From Equation (A17) for 1w > , we have lim 0kt S®¥ =  . It follows that ˆlim 0t p®¥ > . Since 
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(A18), 
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Case 5: 1,w =  1s ¹  
Since 0 1kS a< = <  we have,   
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We consider four different sub-cases. 
5-1) 1s < and dg g< :  We have lim ( ) 1t s p®¥ =   and  lim 1/t z a®¥ = . It follows that  
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 for 1a >  regardless of 
magnitude of 0dg > . 
5-2) 1s >  and dg g< :  We have  lim ( ) 0t s p®¥ =  and  limt z s®¥ = . It follows that 
[ ] [ ]1 1 (1 )( 1)( ) ( 1)( )
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.  
The first term of the numerator is negative, while the sum of second and third term 
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5-4) 1s > and dg g> :  We have lim ( ) 1t s p®¥ =  and lim 1/t z a®¥ =  . It follows that 
( )1 1 (1 )
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Case 6: 1w =  and 1s =  
We always have 0 1kS a< = < , 0 ( ) 1s p b< = < , and   
(1 ) 1z
a
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. Rearranging terms in the left-
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The first term is negative since 
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